HAPPY DIWALI
* * * * * *
61177 Reply from TRIPAS
received on 13 Oct 2014
Most Immediate
Telephone:
23011257 & 23011630
Tri
Service Pay Staff (TRIPAS)
Room
No. 116, Kashmir House
Rajaji
Marg
New
Delhi – 110 011
C/7026/VIIth
CPC/Vol-III 10
Oct 2014
To,
INFORMATION AND
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO 7TH CPC
1. Please refer to
RTI online request No. MODEF/R/2014/61177 dated 30 Jun 14 addressed to MoD D
(RTI) and MoD letter No. 21/4/2014-D (PCC) dated 03 Sep 14.
2. Copy of
information/documents submitted by TRIPAS on behalf of three Services to 7th
CPC till the date of RTI application submitted by you are forwarded herewith as
indicated below: -
(a) Response
to Questionnaire vide this office note C/7026/VIIth CPC dated 25 Jun 14.
(b) Details
of allowances paid to Defence Services vide this office note C/7026/VIIth CPC
dated 12 Jun 14.
3.
It
is requested that receipt of this letter be acknowledged.
Sd/----------------
(V S Chauhan)
Commander
Director TRIPAS
Encl: as
stated above
Copy to: -
MoD D (RTI) ]
MoD D (Pay
Commission Cell) ] for info
B Wing, Sena
Bhawan ]
* * * * *
Telephone:
23011257
C/7026/VIIth
CPC 25
Jun 14
ADJUTANT GENERAL’S
BRANCH
(Tri Service Pay
Staff (TRIPAS)
Room No. 116,
Kashmir House
REPLY TO
QUESTIONNAIRE RELATED TO 7TH CPC
1. Refer to MoD I.D. No. 1 (2)/2014/D
(Pay/Services) dated 19 Jun 14.
2. The Defence
Services response to the questionnaire forwarded by Secy Seventh Central Pay
Commission is forwarded herewith as an enclosure to this note.
3. The information sough vide 7th
CPC letter No. 7CPC/21/Secy’s dated 02 May 14 is being complied from the three
services and is likely to take some time.
Sd/----------------
(V S Chauhan)
Commander
Director TRIPAS
Encl: as
stated above
MoD/Director (AG-I)
B Wing, Sena Bhawan
Info: -
Chairman, Army Pay Cell
ACOP (AC) & Chairman PARC
ACAS (Fin P) & Chairman Air Force
Pay Cell – with enclosure
* * * * *
SEVENTH CENTRAL PAY
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
(Questionnaire for
inviting suggestions/comments from public and other interest groups is in italics)
Encl to TRIPAS Note C/7026/VIIth CPC dated 25 Jun 14
DEFENCE FORCES
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Salaries
1.1 The
considerations on which the minimum salary in case of the lowest Group ‘C’
functionary and the maximum salary in case of a Secretary level officer may be
determined and what should be the reasonable ratio between the two.
1.1.1. Minimum
Salary. The minimum
salary at the lowest Group ‘C’ functionary should be enough to ensure that he
is able to lead life in dignity in the society. The minimum salary should be
based on the following criteria: -
(a) Educational qualifications and skills.
(b) Average family size and the liability that
the Government Servant to maintain this family and the wages ought to be paid
by the Government as a model employer.
(c) The salary should cater for nutritional
requirements, clothing, housing, basic health of all dependants in the family.
The salary should comply with all statutory and constitutional provisions.
(d) The salary should not only maintain his
standard of living by neutralising inflation during past decade but also pass
on the benefits of growth in the economy to the lowest functionary in the Government.
1.1.2. Maximum
Salary. The salary of a Secretary
in the Central Government should be based on seniority and designation and
should have parity with the remuneration being provided to CEOs in the private
sector. Secretary in Central Government is similar to CEOs in private sector.
Secretary in Central Government is similar to CEO of a large company. In
addition, the salary of Secretary in Central Government should be fixed in such
a way that it does not lead to stagnation of pay for officers junior to the
Secretary as their salaries cannot exceed that of Secretary.
1.1.3. The
maximum salary paid to the Secretary should be based on the following criteria:
-
(a) The job content, span
of control, length of service, contribution to national growth/well being, and
the wide experience which a senior officer brings to bear.
(b) Avoid bunching of salaries. At the higher end salaries get bunched up as
a result of pre-determined fixed maximum of scale. To illustrate there is
marginal difference in the higher end of salaries amongst SAG (Rs 77000 with
Grade Pay), HAG (Rs 79000), HAG Plus (Rs 80000) and Secretary scale (Rs 80000).
Therefore, in the Defence Forces within a narrow range of Rs 3000 i.e. from Rs
77000 to Rs 80000, there are four pay scales i.e. Maj Gen, Lt Gen (HAG), Lt Gen
(HAG+) and Army Cdr/equivalent, which are bunched up.
(c) Avoid Stagnation. Though stagnation has been removed as a
result of movement from lower pay band to higher pay band, stagnation does
occur at the end of the spectrum in Pay Band-4. This is because automatic
transition from Pay Band-4 to higher pay band is not permitted. The problem is
more acute in the Defence Forces as Major Generals (SAG) on promotion to the
rank of Major General after 32 years of service do not get full benefit of
promotion increment and start stagnating at Rs 67000. since no increments are
authorised beyond the limit of Pay Band-4.
(d) The maximum salary should not be
pre-determined. It should be based on careful analysis of progression of grades
to include the residual period in that grade and to ensure sufficient gains on each
promotion.
(e) Attraction and retention of talent. This is essential to prevent flight of human
capital from the Government service to the corporate sector. This aspect is
covered in detail in the response to Questions 3.11. to 3.13.
1.1.4. Minimum-Maximum
Ratio (Disparity Ratio). The disparity ratio is an artificial concept which
needs to be discarded. It makes the lowest salary in the government as the
benchmark and connects all higher salaries to it. Historically, the Disparity
Ratio has been reducing across the Pay Commissions. From 54.5 in the First CPC,
it had come down to 10.9 in the Fifth CPC, before increasing marginally to
11.43 in the Sixth CPC. When there is no relationship in the skill levels,
expertise, qualifications between lowest and highest posts, why should these
salaries be connected with an artificial formula? It is suggested that four
cardinal points in the salary structure be determined independent of each
other. The entry level salary of NCs (E) with a Grade Pay of Rs 1800, highest
salary of Subedar Major (Grade Pay Rs 4800), entry level salary of Group ‘A’
and the salary at the Apex level be determined based on the requirements of
attracting and retaining candidates with the desired skills. If Disparity Ratio
is to be computed, it should only be computed within a particular group and not
between Apex scale and entry level of Group ‘C’ employees. For example, Disparity Ratio should be
considered within Group ‘C’ (or Pay Bands 1 & 2), Group ‘B’ (Pay Band 3)
and Group ‘A’) (Pay Band 4) separately.
1.1.5. If
the concept of Disparity Ratio is to be retained, then it will be worthwhile to
compare India’s standing internationally. For this we may uses CIA Gini
Coefficient as a comparator. Gini Coefficient is used to measure the
statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a
nation’s residents. It is worth noting that India has a Gini Coefficient of
36.8. A lower Gini index is an indicator of lower disparity ratio
and vice versa. When we compare this with the indices of other developing
countries e.g. BRICS, India’s index is the lowest as compared to Gini
Coefficients of Brazil (50.8), Russia (41.7), China (47.4) and South Africa (65.0). The Indian
index is also much lower when compared with indices of certain other relevant
countries like Argentina (45.8), Hong Kong (53.7), Iran (44.5), Japan
(37.8), Mexico (51.7), Nigeria (43.7), Philippines (44.8), Singapore (47.8),
Sri Lanka (49.0), Thailand (53.6), Uganda (44.3), UK (40) and USA
(45.0). It is, thus, evident that there is scope for Gini Coefficient of
India to go up and consequently the disparity ration to go up to at least 14.
1.2 What should
be the considerations for determining salary for various levels of functions
falling between the highest level and the lowest level functionaries?
1.2.1. The
considerations for determining the salary of all intervening levels should be
based on the following: -
(a) Education qualifications and professional
pre-requisites.
(b) Skills required
(c) Leadership, span of control, intensity of
control and unique terms of engagement (e.g. willing participation in mortal
combat in case of Defence Forces). In addition, there are other disadvantages
too faced by Defence Forces Personnel which are detailed in response to
question 8.13.
(d) Job content, its degree of difficulty and
complexity, at each successive higher level of authority and responsibility in
decision making.
(e) Pay scales should make a distinct
difference in the emolument structure of an individual on each promotion.
(f) The pay bands should be sufficiently wide
to prevent stagnation.
(g) Optimum utilisation of the pay bands. To
illustrate, JCOs of the Defence Forces are in Pay Band 2. However, the highest
ranking JCO i.e. the Subedar Major does not even cross the maximum of Pay Band
1 (Rs 20, 200) due to short span of service. A more realistically designed Pay
Band would have enabled the JCOs to earn higher pay in keeping with their rank,
responsibility, and length of service.
(h) Avoid stagnation. While stagnation
is avoided in Pay Bands 1, 2 and 3 due to low utilisation of Pay Bands, the
reverse is the true in Pay Band 4 and above. Here as a result of pre-determined
maximum of the pay scale stagnation is rampant, thus defeating the very purpose
of introducing running Pay Bands by VI CPC. Hence there exists a need to
increase the overall disparity ratio.
(j) Above all, the salary structure should
be able to attract the right candidates and retain competent employees at all
levels, while maintaining their rightful status in society. For example, in
Defence Forces, it is of utmost importance that those recruited have the right
motivation and calibre (not discards of civil sector/private sector employment)
so that nation’s security paradigm is in safe hands.
2. Comparisons
2.1 Should
there be any comparison/parity between pay scales and perquisites between
Government and the private sector? If so, why? If not, why not?
2.1.1. The
question seeks comparison/parity between pay scales and perquisites in the
Government and public/private sector. The issue needs to be analysed as a whole
involving both pay scales and perquisites. The earlier notion that Government
servants enjoy more perquisites and pension and hence their pay scale could be
kept lower than the private sector no longer holds good. In the race to attract
the best talent at all levels, the private sector too offers perquisites which
are at par with the Government sector. In fact in aspects such as housing,
travel incidentals, bonus (employee stock options), medical benefits
(insurance) etc, the private sector may be offering better perquisites than the
Government sector. This leads to the obvious inference that there is need to
compare the total compensation/benefits available to the Government servant
with that of the public/private sector. The notion that Government salaries
need to be kept low thus needs to be dispensed with.
2.1.2. A
far as Defence Forces Personnel are concerned, the wide gap between emoluments
offered by private sector and salary/allowances admissible within Government,
coupled with easier lifestyle in civil as compared to harsh deprivations of
service life, has led to increasing exodus of high calibre service personnel to
private sector, a fact which can be empirically established. Almost all Service
personnel who quit the Forces join the private sector. Thus, there is a need to
establish at least a semblance of parity between pay and allowances offered by
the private sector with defence sector.
2.1.3. Security
of Tenure. In today’s era of
liberalisation and globalisation, security of tenure is not as overriding an
issue as it was in yester years. In fact in the private sector job hopping is
resorted to secure accelerated career progression. The flight of human capital
from the Government sector to private sector also underlines this trend.
Moreover, for Defence Forces security of tenure in a station is extremely low
due to frequent postings which could be every one-two years for officers,
further aggravated by very early retirement age for rank and file.
2.1.4. In
the light of the above, there are valid grounds for a fair comparison of
salaries between Government and private sector.
2.2 Should there at all be any comparison/parity between pay scales and
perquisites between Government and the public sector? If so, why? If not, why
not?
2.2.1. Due
to availability of much superior employment and economic opportunities, youth today
opts for a lifestyle with less hardships and superior financial returns and
perks. The pecking order for the youth is thus clear – Private
Industry/Corporate sector first, followed by Public sector undertakings or
academic institutes followed by Government sector (within Government sector,
Armed Forces occupy a still lower echelon). Thus, apart from comparing salaries
of private sector jobs, comparison with public sector jobs (PSU, banks etc) has
become equally important.
2.3 The concept
of variable pay has been introduced in Central Public Sector Enterprises by the
Second Pay Revision Committee. In the case of the Government is there merit in
introducing a variable component of pay? Can such variable pay be linked to
performance?
2.3.1. The
issue has been examined by earlier Pay Commissions. The V and VI CPC made
substantive recommendations on performance related increments. However, schemes
like PRIS could not be implemented as such schemes may have detrimental
effect on the organisations in terms of affecting the team spirit and cohesion.
Unlike the civil services, the Defence Forces have a steep pyramidal structure
where organisation effectiveness is totally dependent on team work, empathy and
camaraderie. Hence variable pay is not recommended for the Defence Forces.
Instead, what is required is adequate increments/monetary incentive on
promotion which would, indirectly serve as variable pay.
3. Attracting Talent
3.1 Does the
present compensation package attract suitable talent in the All India Services
& Group A Services? What are your observations and suggestions in this
regard?
3.1.1. On
the question of whether the compensation package enables attraction of suitable
talent in the Defence Forces is concerned, the answer is an emphatic NO. The
issue of attraction of suitable talent needs to be seen from two different
perspectives. The attractiveness of the Armed forces amongst the youth of the
country is on a progressive decline. The extensive media campaign by the Armed
forces to meet their recruitment targets amply exemplifies the crisis being
experienced by the Armed Forces. While such aggressive advertisement campaigns
have been able to partially overcome the shortages in terms of quantity, they
have not been able to attract the desired quality of manpower. This situation
is likely to worsen with the improvement in the economic scenario over the next
few years.
3.1.2. Attractiveness
of Defence Forces as a Standalone Entity. The Defence Forces are not able to attract talent due to a variety of factors as
follows: -
(a) Risk and Deprivation Factor. Threat
to life, truncated careers, separation from families, constrained career
prospects, frequent transfers, ‘reserve’ liability, restriction of fundamental
rights, harsh and daunting work environment, isolation, and deprivation are the
obvious and upfront constraints which are generally known. But the not so
obvious and not so explicit are the resultant disadvantages which include the
constrained education levels of Armed Forces children, their inhibited
emotional growth and mental turmoil owing to frequent absence of the fathers.
Separation imposes a disconsolate barrier to the conjugal life and professional
growth of the soldier’s spouse. The ever-present premonition of impending
calamity and threat to life leaves a lasting and negative impact, not only on
the soldier but his entire family. Truncated career is perhaps the most
disparaging disadvantage the military personnel face. A soldier devoid of the
benefits of service, at ages varying from 35 to 50 years of age, when his
family responsibilities are at its zenith. He consequently draws a
significantly lesser total pay in his entire service life span than any other
Government servant and left to cope with a long and arduous retired life, all
alone. In a materialistic environment, the tendency of the youth to opt for a
low paying and risky job is extremely low. This aspect is reflected in the
large deficiency in the officer cadre too.
(b) Lowering of Status/Erosion of Historical parities.
Attractiveness of a career is a function of pay, perks and status. While there
is little scope to obviate drawbacks of tangible and intangible deprivation,
risks and hardships that are borne by personnel of the Defence Forces, the
steady erosion in historical parities in pay, status and glamour is reducing
the attractiveness of the Defence Forces.
(c) Better Compensation in Private Sector.
Post liberalisation, the availability of high paying jobs in the private sector
has increased exponentially.
(d) Together these lead to reduced intake both
in terms of quality (both officers and men) as well as quality (applicable to
the officer cadre).
3.1.3. Attraction
of Defence Forces vis-à-vis AIS/Group ‘A’ Services. Even when compared to
civil Government employment, the attractiveness of the Services rank very low
on the scale. Various factors contributing to this phenomenon are as under: -
(a) Inadequate Compensation for Difficult
Service Conditions. The tangible and intangible disadvantages of military
service are not adequately compensated. There is even a restriction of
fundamental and constitutional rights when it comes to Defence Forces
Personnel. Apart from the lower life time earning of Defence Forces personnel,
as compared to their civilian counterparts, even the compensation for difficult
service conditions is paltry i.e. Rs 2000 per month for JCOs/OR.
(b) Loss of Status vis-à-vis Civil
Government Servants. There has
been an indisputable and steady erosion of status enjoyed by Armed Force
personnel, right since independence. Post VI CPC, a High Powered Committee was
ordered by the PMO to resolve status/command and control issues between defence
Forces and Civil employees. Unfortunately this High Powered Committee has not
been constituted till date.
(c) Highly Skewed Cadre Ratios. The percentage of Defence Forces officers in
higher ranks such as SAG and above is negligible. This serves as a disincentive
to potential recruits. Coupled with low cadre ratios, the Defence Forces have extremely
low promotional prospects leading to 95% of the personnel retiring in the ranks
of Col (TS)/equivalent. The following table illustrates the glaring inequality
in cadre ratios of Defence Forces vis-à-vis Civil employees, the Armed Forces
being at the lowest end of the spectrum by a huge margin: -
Grade
|
IAS (%)
|
Gp ‘A’ Weighted average (%)
|
Armed Forces Existing (%)
|
Apex
|
5.85
|
2.89
|
0.02
|
HAG+
|
0.0
|
0.32
|
0.08
|
HAG
|
16.1.
|
5.29
|
0.17
|
SAG
|
25.6
|
13.43
|
0.75
|
Below SAG
|
52.45
|
78.07
|
98.98
|
Total
|
100
|
100
|
100
|
(d) Non-Functional Upgradation. To make matters worse, the NFU which has
been extended to Civil Services has been denied to the Defence Forces. Thus all
Group ‘A’ officers now get promoted to higher grade two years later than the
IAS. This dispensation has been denied to the Defence Forces on the specious
plea that Services do not fall under the definition of organised Group ‘A’
Services. While the Pay Commissions and Government have thought it proper to
address the legitimate aspirations of civil services other than the IAS with
alacrity, no such consideration has been extended to the Defence Forces where
organisational structure and unique terms and conditions of service place them
at the bottom of the matrix. Thus a liberalised scheme (NFU) which the Government
extended to civilians has been denied to Armed Forces, an unequal treatment
meted out vis-à-vis Civil Services cadre.
(e) Early Retirement. Defence Forces are the only Services where
personnel retire by rank. Thus all ranks other than Lt Gen retire at ages
varying from 38 years to 58 years. This leads to loss of lifetime earnings both
in terms of pay and pension. This forced early retirement is not being
compensated in any manner.
(f) Together these deficiencies vis-à-vis
Civil Services act as a major disincentive to attract talent in the Defence
Forces.
3.2 To what
extent should government compensation be structured to attract special
talent?
3.2.1. Armed
Forces require talented leaders with quick decision making ability, capability
to take risks and motivate personnel by setting an example in order to win
battles for the country. Technical acumen to employ weaponry with state of the
art multidisciplinary technology, imbued with a spirit of gallantry and
adventure which leaders must possess in armed forces at all levels. This
deserves suitable Government compensation so that suitable ‘Special Talent’ is
recruited in Defence Forces. Disconcertingly, today not only is there an
absence of any such compensation, but on the contrary a sense of discrimination
is evident from the following: -
(a) Disabilities Act. Due to specific requirement of the Armed
Forces to have fully fit personnel for combat duties, the Central Government is
exercise of powers vested under the provisions of Section 47 of the said Act
has issued a notification dated 28 Mar 2002 exempting the combatant Armed
Forces personnel from the operation of Section 47 of the said Act. This
exclusion has led to some very grave disparity in terms of Armed Forces
personnel having no protection of employment due to forced discharge from
service on grounds of disability which is at a much higher ratio compared to
any other service due to physical/climatic hardships and constant risk. In view
of non-applicability of Section 47 of the said Act, personnel of the Armed
Forces should be suitably compensated by the Government for forced early
discharge from service on grounds of disability.
(b) Non-extension of NFU. Non-extension of NFU to Defence
Forces is highly discriminatory. In this connection please refer to response at
Para 3.1.3 (d) above.
4. Pay Scales
4.1 The 6th
Central Pay Commission introduced the system of Pay Bands and Grade Pay as
against the system of specific pay scales attached to various posts. What has
been the impact of running pay bands post implementation of 6th CPC
recommendations?
4.1.1. The
impact of running pay bands and grade pay has had the intended benefits, albeit
with limitations. These are discussed below.
4.1.2. Intended
Benefit.
(a) Removal of stagnation. In
cases of cadres where promotional prospects are very low and employees were
earlier stagnating at the top of the pay scale, can now look forward to annual
increments.
(b) This enables suitable monetary compensation
to Government employees in keeping with their growing social and familial
obligations.
4.1.3. Limitations.
(a) While stagnation has been removed in Pay
Bands 1 to 3, there is stagnation in PB-4 since transition from PB-4 to HAG
scale is not permitted for Armed Forces though it is available under IAS pay
rules. In the Defence Forces since
there are more ranks in PB-4 vis-à-vis the civil employees, alongwith merger of
MSP in the pay on promotion to the rank of Maj Gen the problem of stagnation is
acutely felt.
(b) Further the termination of running pay band
at SAG level and retention of specific scales at HAG and above results in
meagre gains at levels of HAG and above.
(c) It is felt that the concept of Grade Pay
primarily provides for additional incentives/increment to an individual on
promotion, especially within the same Pay Band. The requirement of Grade Pay
therefore is indispensable with the existing system of Pay Bands. Although
Grade Pay was envisaged for determining the intra-service hierarchy but
practically the same is being used to compare inter-service equivalence. This
has resulted in loss of parity and reduction in status for Defence forces. The
omission of erstwhile Rank Pay and depressed Grade Pays given to the Armed
Forces has further complicated the issue and has resulted in a number of
anomalies.
4.2 Is there any need to bring
about any change?
4.2.1. As
mentioned before, there are severe problems in PB-4. The Pay Bands PB-1 to PB-4
are designed on the basis of civilian organisation and promotion system. They
do not cater to the unique cadre/rank structure of Armed Forces and its
promotional prospects. Thus a large portion of PB-1, PB-2 and PB-3 are
unutilised by Armed Forces personnel while there is stagnation in PB-4. The
net effect is of Armed Forces pay structure being force-fitted into civilian
pay bands with the result that numerous anomalies have arisen with a surfeit of
legal cases.
4.2.2. Presently,
Military Service Pay (MSP) is merged in the pay band on promotion to the grade
pay of Rs 10000/-. This causes stagnation in the case of Maj Gen and above. The
top of the pay band for Maj Gen and above should be higher than the
corresponding civilian pay by the amount of MSP. Alternately, Maj Gen on
stagnation should be allowed to move to HAG scale. In order to address the
imperfections discussed above, there is need to improve the system of running
pay bands. Some of the suggestions are as under:-
(a) In order to make a viable difference on
promotion, two additional increments should be granted to Defence Forces
Personnel. This is especially merited due to their steep pyramidal structure,
minimal promotional opportunities, early retirement age and non-utilisation of
Pay Bands 1 to 3 as brought out earlier.
(b) The Pay Band 4 for Defence Officers should
be based on Rs 37000-73000 (upper (sic) ceiling of Rs 67000 being
increased by Rs 6000 to accommodate the MSP). This will resolve a number of
anomalies like junior officers today drawing more pay/pension than senior
officers (Brigs drawing more pay than Army Cdrs/equivalent in Apex Scale).
(c) The running pay band should be extended to
HAG and HAG Plus scales also. The pay scale of a Secretary (i.e. the maximum
scale) should lie well beyond such a running pay band.
(d) On stagnation at the top of PB-4, the individual
should be permitted to draw pay in HAG scale on the lines of similar provisions
for lower pay bands and as available for other Group ‘A’ Services.
(e) The Grade Pay of Commissioned Officers
needs to be refixed in conformity with the past parities in spirit of Para 2
(b) of Terms of reference approved for VII CPC and judgments of Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
4.3 Did the pay
bands recommended by the Sixth CPC help in arresting exodus and attract talent
towards the Government?
4.3.1. Failure
to attract talent towards the Government or prevention of exodus from
Government to private sector is a factor of Government compensation structure
when compared to private sector. It is independent of the fact whether
Government pay structure is based on specific pay scales or running pay bands.
In order to attract talent or prevent exodus, the Government pay structure
should be bench-marked against the private sector. In Defence Forces, the
problem of exodus to private sector is exacerbated due to acute pyramidal structure.
Thus, talented, highly qualified officers who do not get promoted due to
non-availability of vacancies in higher ranks quit to join the private sector.
This exodus/attrition has not abated and measures need to be devised to retain
them in the organisation to prevent loss to the Government.
4.3.2. In
light of the above, it is also imperative that strength of support cadre
(primarily Short Service Commission (SSC) be increased to balance the ratio
between regular cadre and support cadre which is highly skewed towards regular
cadre. The objective is to have a large support cadre of SSC officers and a
lean cadre of regular officers. This will provide better promotional
opportunities for regular cadre officers and arrest their exodus (triggered by
low promotion avenues). For a large support cadre of SSC Officers the
attractiveness of SSC Cadre has to be increased. Presently, the attractiveness
of SSC is limited due to lack of lucrative exit benefits. SSC can be made
attractive by considering proposals like Pension under NPS, Severance Package
and Lateral Transfer.
4.4 Successive
Pay Commissions have reduced the number of pay scales by merging one or two pay
scales together. Is there a case for the number of pay scales/ pay band to be
rationalized and if so in what manner?
4.4.1. All
the past Pay Commissions have tried to reduce the pay scales by grouping number
of scales and evolving a new scale for such groups. This has, in many cases,
resulted in anomalous situations for inter-se parity which are yet to be
resolved. For example, in Defence Forces in multi-cadre environment like MES,
amongst peers civilians are in a higher grade than military officers (ADG and
Chief Engineer level) while seniors (Colonels) are in the same as their
civilian juniors (SE). This has disrupted the functional harmony and is leading
to severe command and control problems. Hence, reduction of pa grades or merger
of pay scales, if desired, should be carried out scientifically taking into
consideration the job content for the merged posts and peculiarity of each
service.
4.4.2. Rationalisation
of pay scales/grades is an ongoing process for delayering of Government
machinery. Probably it is an unavoidable
exercise. However, the more important point is to visualise the impact on other
Services where such delayering is not feasible or is not being undertaken. In
the case of Defence Forces such delayering has had an adverse impact as under:
-
(a) The Government pay structure, which is
specifically designed for Civil Services, when applied to Defence Forces leads
to low utilisation of pay bands, stagnation in higher ranks and marginal gains
on promotion.
(b) Further, civilians in pay scales/grades
which were earlier lower to Defence Forces come to occupy higher pay
scales/grades as invariably lower pay scale/grade pay gets merged with higher
pay scales/grade.
(c) In the case of Junior Commissioned Officers
and Other Ranks of the Defence Forces the delayering of scales was done by
awarding common pay scales with effect from 01 Jan 2006. However, this
delayering was not extended to those personnel who were already in service.
Hence, in respect of JCOs/ORs multiplicity of scales remain. This has lead to
considerable anguish and low morale in these ranks.
(d) Hence any exercise of reducing pay
scales/grades without corresponding modification to Defence Forces pay
scales/grades leads to hierarchical upheaval which is not conducive to
efficiency and is retrograde in a multiple cadre environment.
4.5 Is the
“grade pay” concept working? If not, what are your alternative
suggestions?
4.5.1. The
concept of Grade Pay is an essential element of the running pay band structure.
This is so because in a running pay band, an employee keeps rising in his pay
band which spans more than one grade. Hence, in order to differentiate between
two posts within the same pay band, grant of higher grade pay to a superior
post is essential.
4.5.2. Theoretically,
the concept of Grade Pay would not have had any problems if the entire
Government bureaucracy were to operate in an environment where cadre structure,
terms and conditions of service and promotion prospects are similar. However,
the reality is different. In the Defence Forces, when operating in a
multi-cadre environment, it has been noticed that Grade Pay of two equivalent
officers (peers) is different and at places the subordinate civil officers are
having higher grade pay on a non-functional basis than their superior, a
uniformed officer. This has lead to severe command and control problems in
Defence Forces.
4.5.3. Though
the VI CPC has stipulated that grade pay would count for status equation only
within a cadre, its abuse is rampant for drawing equation on an inter-cadre
basis.
4.5.4. Various
alternative suggestions are as under: -
(a) Rationalisation of Grade Pay, especially of
Defence Forces, in consonance with Civil Services based on length of service.
(b) Abolition of Concept of Grade Pay. This would involve merging of the
functional grade pay with the pay in the pay band. On promotion, an individual
could be granted additional increments to cover the gap between lower and
higher grade pay. Status could be determined with reference to the post held.
(c) Entitlements in respect of housing,
transport allowance ad travel etc would be determined on a minimum laid down
pay in the pay band in case of above.
5. Increment
5.1 Whether the
present system of annual increment on 1st July of every year uniformly in
case of all employees has served its purpose or not? Whether any changes are
required?
5.1.1. The
present system of annual increment on 1st July of every years
uniformly in case of all employees has generally served its purpose. However,
there is one provision which is inconsistent with the entire scheme. In cases
of promotions, if the government employee opts to get his pay fixed in the
higher grade from the date of his promotion, he shall get his first increment
in the higher grade on the next 1st July if he was promoted between
2nd July and 1st January. However, if he was again
promoted between 2nd January and 30th June of a
particular year, he shall get his increment on 1st of July next year
(Ref MoF O. M. F No. 1/1/2008-IC dated 13.09.2008).
5.1.2. The
system is discriminatory against some personnel only based on the date of
promotion. Those promoted in the first half of the year lose out vis-à-vis
those who are promoted in the second half of the calendar year. It is not clear
what the aim of this clause is or what this clause seeks to achieve.
5.2 What should
be the reasonable quantum of annual increment?
5.2.1. The
quantum of annual increment is correlated with the following: -
(a) Length of the pay band
(b) The minima and maxima fixed
(c) Other factors like increasing
responsibilities, social factor, inflation, comparative annual increase in private sector etc
5.2.2. Thus
the rate of annual increment should be increased from 3% to 5%. However, such a
change cannot be done in isolation without improving the maximum of the pay
scale. Increasing the annual increment would definitely lead to more optimal
utilisation of pay in Pay Bands 1 to 3. However, it will cause stagnation in
Pay Band 4 in an earlier time frame. Hence there is need to sufficiently
elongate Pay Band 4 by enhancing its upper limit and thus the need to increase
Disparity Ratio.
5.2.3. The
increase in annual increment from 3% to 5% is based on the aspirational aspects
of Government servants. Unlike in the private sector, Government salaries
remain static for a period of 10 years or more. While the private sector
salaries get substantial hike in years of economic boom they also benefit from
bonuses and ESOPs. The private sector employees are thus compensated to a
disproportionately higher level vis-à-vis Government servants. Hence an increase
to 5% is considered minimum and inescapable.
5.3 Whether
there should be a provision of variable increments at a rate higher than the
normal annual increment in case of high achievers? If so, what should be
transparent and objective parameters to assess high achievement, which could be
uniformly applied across Central Government?
5.3.1. The
system of performance related incentives/increments has been recommended by
previous pay commissions but it was not accepted by the government. In the
light of the history of the issue it appears to be unsuitable to the government
sector. However progressive improvements in the percentage of increments over
the length of service may be considered. As far as Performance incentives for
Defence Forces is concerned, the earlier response at Para 2.3.1 is also
relevant.
5.4 Under the
MACP scheme three financial up-gradations are allowed on completion of 10, 20,
30 years of regular service, counted from the direct entry grade. What are the
strengths and weaknesses of the scheme? Is there a perception that a scheme of
this nature, in some Departments, actually incentivizes people who do not wish
to take the more arduous route of qualifying departmental examinations/ or
those obtaining professional degrees?
5.4.1. The
MACP scheme for Defence Forces, applicable to Other Ranks is definitely an
incentive and needs to be improved. The reasons for such assertion are as
under: -
(a) Defence Forces are rank based organisations
and personnel retire at much earlier age – lower rank and lower age of
retirement.
(b) The steep pyramidal structure results in
very few vacancies in higher ranks and hence the need to attain these ranks
before completing their terms of engagement in the lower ranks.
(c) As a result maximum population of the
Defence Forces (in Other Ranks) retires in the rank in which they were
enrolled, i.e. Sepoy or equivalent. MACP enables them to retire with a pay of
Havildar.
(d) Since MACP provides financial upgradations
based on length of service, it should continue to remain in force.
5.4.2. In
fact there is a need to further extend MACP to four pay promotions (so that
Other Ranks do not retire early without availing MACP, as is the case now) and
reduce the time for each MACP, due to early retirement ages of NCOs/OR. This
will ensure that each NCO/OR enjoys three MACP promotions as is the case in
civil. Proposal envisaging four MACPs for Defence Forces at 6, 12, 18 and 24
years will be submitted to VII Central Pay Commission subsequently.
6. Performance
6.1. What kind of incentives would you suggest to
recognize and reward good performance?
6.1.1. Promotions
are rewards for good performance. Any other element will introduce some
undesirable by-products such as de-motivating other employees. It is for this
reason that performance related incentive schemes could not be implemented
despite substantive recommendations by two Pay Commissions. Since Promotions
are just reward for good performance, there is need to look at the Armed
Forces promotion system. It is generally accepted by all personnel to be a fair
system which is based solely on merit subject to meeting other eligibility
conditions. The system is able to motivate all personnel to strive hard and is
also able to select best leadership for senior positions.
6.1.2. In
the case of JCOs/ORs in the Armed Forces there exists a system of grant of
monetary awards in the form of Good Conduct Badge/Good Service Pay and
Classification Pay. The Classification Pay is taken into account for
calculation of pension. On similar lines, the monetary benefit for Good Conduct
Badge may be converted into additional increments for inclusion in the pay
structure.
6.1.3. In
addition, the financial incentives, associated with gallantry awards should be
extended to non-gallantry/distinguished service awards.
7. Impact on other organizations
Salary
structures in the Central and State Governments are broadly similar. The
recommendations of the Pay Commission are likely to lead to similar demands
from employees of State Governments, municipal bodies, panchayati raj
institutions & autonomous institutions. To what extent should their paying
capacity be considered in devising a reasonable remuneration package for
Central Govt. employees?
7.1.1. Since
the central Pay Commission makes recommendations based on the performance of
the national economy which also includes the States within its purview, it is
recommended that the State Governments leverage the CPC awards as a benchmark
and recommend their awards in consultation with the Central Government.
8. Defence Forces
8.1 What should
be the considerations for fixing salary in case of Defence personnel and in
what manner does the parity with civil services need to be evolved, keeping in
view their respective job profiles?
8.1.1. Attractiveness
of the Defence Forces is the fundamental aspect which any nation must review
periodically to ensure rightful share of young men/women in the society
possessed of requisite educational qualifications, technical calibre, physical
fitness and psychological aptitude volunteer for a career in the Armed Forces.
Any salary package for the Defence Forces Personnel should be based on certain
underlying principles which must be consistent with the overriding need to promote
attractiveness of service and retentivity of employee, and reflect the
fundamental concepts and principles of fairness and equity. Compensation
should be so designed to foster and maintain the concept of the profession of
arms as a dignified, respected, sought after and honourable career. The
emotional and spiritual satisfaction gained from the dedicated uniformed
service in itself is not sufficient and it has to be coupled with compensation
sufficient enough for an individual member to maintain a standard of living
commensurate with his aspirations and responsibilities that directly affect the
security of the nation. There could be no Armed Forces sans the spirit of
patriotism. At the same time, in peace time, patriotism by itself is not an
adequate motivation for a career in the Services. It is opined that, within the
broad framework of national comparators, public sector not excluded, the salary
structure of services must bear a stamp of equity, both in terms of monetary
value and progressive profile.
8.1.2. Historical
parities. With regard to the issue of
parity with civil servants the following suggestions are made: -
(a) Warrants of Precedence of 1979 read with
Warrant of Precedence of 1937 and 1947 should be the cornerstone of protocol
and parities which should determine inter-organisational equations for ensuring
efficient working environment within the Government frame work especially with
regard to Defence Forces where these relativities have eroded.
(b) Within the above relativities, let there be
common lower and upper cardinal points of pay fixation for all Class I
services, including the IAS.
(c) Based on cadre structure of each service,
let there be approximate parity in the minimum assured level of career
progression.
(d) There should be a narrowing down of the
wide difference in the number of entrants who can hope to reach the top of the
scale in various organisations.
(e) If for reasons of pyramidal cadre structure
or other reasons, there are wide disparities of growth rate in various services,
let there be some compensation for employees who are forced to stagnate for no
fault of their own.
(f) The progression in the Defence Forces is
symbolised by advancement in rank. Absence of rank pay is a Defence Forces
specific anomaly and needs to be introduced for all Select Grade ranks viz.
Colonel/Brigadier/All General Officers till the Army Commanders.
8.1.3. The
salary structure of Armed Forces Personnel as far as possible should be similar
to the salary of comparable civilian employees. The present salary structure
of Defence Forces is in disarray due to faulty concept of running pay bands. It
has arise due to force-fitting the civilian pay structure on Defence Forces.
The deviations warranted by special conditions, which are generally not applicable
to the civilians warrant special/different dispensation. The ‘X’ factor is
being addressed by Military Service Pay which should however be made credible
(increased to offer adequate compensation for tangible/intangible hardships)
and linked to the Basic Pay. The disparity that has arises over the years needs
to be addressed in the following manner: -
(a) Comparison of Lifetime Earnings. In view of the truncated career and limited
promotion avenues, the lifetime earnings of Defence Forces Personnel are much
lower than their civilian counterparts. There has also been distinct erosion in
historical parities that these personnel enjoyed in comparison with their
civilian counterparts. This disparity needs to be bridged by taking either of
the following approaches: -
(i) Higher Pay Scales. Defence Forces Personnel need to be
compensated by higher pay scales to make up for the loss in lifetime earnings
vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts.
(ii) Higher Retirement Benefits. Review of the pension which is presently 50%
of the RE may also be considered to address the disparity in lifetime earnings.
(iii) Combination of Pay and Pension. A combined review of pay scales and pension
package could also be considered to bridge the gap in lifetime earnings.
(b) Edge. In IV Pay Commission a distinct element of Rank Pay
was carved out of the pay scales and awarded to Defence Forces Personnel up to
the rank of Brigadier/equivalent thus providing an edge over the civilian Group
‘A’ officers. The Vth Pay Commission also maintained the edge, but however
reverted from running pay bands to individual pay scales. The VIth Pay
Commission, however, introduced a new concept of Grade Pay and made it
applicable to all Central Government services, thus eliminating the edge
enjoyed by the Armed Forces in terms of rank pay. A survey of the Armed
Forces of prominent armies in the world revealed that they provide an edge to
Defence Forces Personnel not only in pay but also in pensions. In India
there is no edge enjoyed by the Defence Forces in pay (in fact it is lower than
that of civilian counterparts) and the pension is at the same level of 50% (of
last pay drawn). Thus there is a strong case for restoring the edge
in pay of Defence Forces both in pay and pension.
(c) Compensation for Tangible/Intangible
Hardships (‘X’ Factor). It is essential to compensate the soldiers for
those aspects of service which are neither situational or location specific nor
pertain to skills or expertise. These
are factors that are difficult to quantify and are essentially psychological in
nature. The twin purposes of such compensation if to firstly convey to the
military man that the State and the people appreciate his special role in wars
and peace alike and the associated deprivations imposed on him to be ever ready
for the purpose, and secondly to generate a sense of pride in him and thereby
foster in him the desired fortitude and determination to enable him to
unflinchingly lay down his life to uphold the honour and integrity of the
Country.
8.1.4. The
Armed Forces are as much part of the society as any other occupational group in
the country albeit with peculiar conditions of service which are absent
elsewhere. In terms of harshness of life, hazardous nature of job, privations,
tribulations, acceptance of restrictions on civil liberties under stringent
provisions of the Amy/Navy/Air Force Acts, the Armed Forces comprise the
riskiest occupational group than any other. Being part of the society demands
that its pay and allowances be made equitable with other occupational groups of
the Government and thereafter an edge be provided along with compensation for
tangible/intangible hardships.
8.2 In what manner should the concessions and facilities, both in cash
and kind, be taken into account for determining salary structure in case of
Defence Forces personnel.
8.2.1. The
concessions available to Defence Forces Personnel are also available to
Government Civilian personnel in one form or other e.g. medical facilities
(Military Hospitals vs. CGHS), Canteen facilities (CSD vs. Kendriya Bhandar),
Travel Concessions Vs LTC, Housing, Electricity and water without special
concessions to Defence Forces. The only exclusive benefits are: -
(a) Leave Entitlement. This is to compensate for postings in remote
areas (no family accommodation) and even peace stations which are far removed
from one’s native place and have limited family accommodation. Thus a soldier
has to accomplish all his family, society and human needs within 60 days of
annual (earned) leave which a civilian generally accomplishes in all 365 days a
year.
(b) Entitled Rations. These are included in the Terms &
Conditions of Service of a soldier and have to be provided to meet enhanced
calorific needs of a soldier as also the fact that he stays in a barrack with
common kitchen for hundreds of his colleagues. It is to e noted that entitled
rations are provided at a comparatively meagre scale and are priced very low.
8.2.2. MSP. MSP is an addendum emolument
granted to Brigadiers and below only to address those tangible/intangible
constraints and disadvantages unique to Military Personnel which affect them
for most part of their service career and in their retired lives. MSP is aimed
at positively influencing the performance parameters of the Military Men. The
MSP is neither synonymous nor an alternative to the existing pay and
allowances. It is an independent and a de-novo compensation factor, which was
granted by the VIth CPC in addition to the existing and proposed emoluments.
The intangible disadvantages have two essential characteristics.
Firstly, they are not overtly obvious and consequently have yet to be comprehensively
addressed in the Pat structures of the Defence Forces, and secondly, in
addition to its adverse impact on the family of a soldier, have a direct and
constraining influence on the professional output of soldiers. While
relevant in peace stations, the factor assumes more acute characteristics in
field and operational situations. Unfortunately, MSP granted to Defence Forces
by the VIth CPC is being treated as a panacea for non-resolution of all
anomalies which remained unaddressed post VIth CPC. However, despite the grant
of MSP, the lifetime earning of Defence Forces personnel remain considerably
less vis-à-vis civilian counterparts as the other benefits such as NFU or
liberalised terms and conditions of service are not available to the Defence
Forces. Therefore, the compensation that MSP is expected to provide for the
hardships of service is in reality a mirage. Following have been identified as
intangible disadvantage which a Defence Forces Personnel is subjected to:
-
(a) The ever present premonition of impending
calamity and threat to life.
(b) Truncated careers in conjunction
with ‘reduced life cycle pay’ and ‘reduced life.’
(c) Separation from families for
prolonged periods which in turn results in acute stress and psychological
ailments in the entire family of the soldier.
(d) Transfers and dislocations and its
impact on children and spouse.
(e) Bleak career prospects and the
resultant constrained service longevity.
(f) Restriction of Fundamental Rights.
(g) Reserve liability after retirement.
(h) Requirement of stringent physical
standards and its impact on career security and ensuing stress.
(j) Undefined and unlimited working hours.
(k) Isolation and deprivation.
(l) Long term physical and psychological
ailments resulting from service in extreme terrain and climatic conditions
and the effects of continuous exposure to hazardous situations.
8.2.3. As
far as other benefits in cash are concerned i.e. Allowances, they are either
at par with those granted to civilian counterparts, or even lower in many
cases. To illustrate, the compensation granted for serving in Counter
Insurgency prone areas in the NE and J & K are much lower for the Services
than their civilian counterparts. This is because the allowances for Defence
Forces Personnel are based on slabs, while the civilian allowances are based on
percentage of pay. The most glaring iniquitous compensation is evident in the
Instructional Allowance granted at 30% of Basic Pay (tax exempt) to civil
officers vis-à-vis Rs 2250 (not tax exempt) granted to the Defence Forces
officers.
8.2.4. Thus
it can be seen that concessions and facilities available to Defence
Forces Personnel should in no way impact the determination of their salary
structure which has to be designed based on considerations stipulated in
Paras 8.1.1. to 8.1.4 above. Just a couple of concessions available are
additional which have been granted in the context of their ‘exclusive nature of
job,’ ‘imperatives of ensuring security’ and ‘tangible/intangible
hardships.’
8.3 As per the
November 2008 orders of the Ministry of Defence, there are a total of 45 types
of allowances for Personnel Below Officer Rank and 39 types of allowances for
Officers. Does a case exist for rationalization/ streamlining of the current
variety of allowances?
8.3.1. Allowances
are not a perk or profit. They exist to recompense for circumstances which
cannot be addressed in Basic Pay, Additional (or Special) Pay or the ‘X’ Factor
(MSP). They focus on the personnel for whom they are properly intended.
Allowances conform to one or more of the following aspects: -
(a) Compensation for Financial Disadvantage. The additional cost of discharging
responsibilities and duties in response to exigencies of military service.
(b) Reimbursement. For additional
expenses that are incurred in the course of duty.
(c) Retention. Some allowances address particular conditions of service
which cannot be properly recognised by pay or ‘X’ Factor.
8.3.2. It
needs to be understood that there are only six categories of allowances,
including five for 22 service-specific allowances. All these allowances are not
admissible to all ranks at all times. Within a given category, not more than
one allowance is usually admissible to any personnel. These allowances are
admissible only to the personnel meeting the specific eligibility conditions of
specific allowances for limited periods of applicability. Besides these, 25
allowances are common to both Defence Forces and Central Government Civilian
employees. It is also to be noted that there are a total of approximately 32
Civilian specific allowances which are not available to the Armed Forces. While
number of allowances for Defence Forces may seem more, they are listed with
different nomenclatures owing to the degree of risk or geographical location. For
example, Defence Forces Personnel serve in remote areas i.e. High Altitude
Allowance/Field Area Allowance/Uncongenial Allowance/SCCIA/Field Area Allowance
which are all forms of the Special Duty Allowance (SDA) available to civilian
personnel. While the SDA is available as a percentage of pay, the Defence
Forces Personnel are paid on a slab basis, which amounts to lower allowances
for Defence Forces Personnel for comparatively much harsher, stringent and life
threatening working conditions.
8.3.3. To
view the concept of allowances to Armed Forces in correct perspective,
following considerations are pertinent: -
(a) Though the total number of allowances
appear large, the scope is highly limited. All allowances are not admissible to
all ranks at all times. Within the total six broad categories of allowances
granted to the Armed Forces, not more than one allowance is usually admissible
to any personnel at any given time. Most allowances are granted to only the
affected cross-section of personnel, and that too for the specific period of
applicability, and hence to presume that all listed allowances are granted
to all Services personnel concurrently, would be fallacious. The remaining
allowances are admissible to sectoral groups of personnel at varying times in
their careers.
(b) Whilst each allowance in the Armed
Forces is viewed as an individualistic nomenclature, the civilian allowances
appear to get broad banded either as special pay or a compensatory allowance.
Broad banding of allowances into common nomenclature for Defence Forces results
in only six broad categories of allowances as brought out earlier in Para
8.3.2.
(c) The rates of allowances are generally
doubles during Pay Commission recommendations, while the pay scales are
enhanced by a higher multiple. This progressively reduces the share of
allowances as a proportion of pay.
(d) While most allowances granted to civilians
are in terms of percentage of Basic Pay, those extended to Armed Forces
Personnel are predominantly slab based, much lower comparatively and are not
inflation proof. Thus, in absolute terms, Defence Forces Personnel, get
lower allowances than their civilian counterparts, when both are posted in
same/similar areas.
8.3.4. View
Point. The range and
scope of allowances, for compensating vastly diverse and peculiar conditions of
engagement of Armed Forces personnel should continue. There is an imminent need
to link most of these allowances to percentage of salary rather than be slab
based. Further, the inter-se ratio between pay structure and allowances should
be generally maintained.
8.4 What are
the options available for addressing the increasing expenditure on Defence
pensions?
8.4.1. With
introduction of NPS, all Government employees recruited post 01 Jan 2004 have
migrated from the ‘defined benefit’ scheme to the ‘defined
contribution’ scheme. Thus the dual pension system of ‘defined benefit’
(pre 01 Jan 2004 entrants) and ‘defined contribution’ (post 01 Jan 2004
entrants) would continue till 2035 by which time all the pre-01 Jan 2004
entrants would have retired. Beyond 2035 only the ‘defined contribution’
system would remain in force. Since the raison d’être of introduction of
NPS was to reduce the pension budget it may be said that the pension budget of
the Government is considerably reduced. However, expenditure on the matching
Government contribution of 10% towards each Government employee for pension
still remains.
8.4.2. In
view of the foregoing, paying of pensions under the ‘defined benefit’
scheme to Defence Forces Personnel should continue in the light of the fact
that historically too, it was only the Armed Forces who were entitled to
pension and the obligation of the Government to fulfil its covenant with the
Armed Forces.
8.4.3. Notwithstanding
the above, some suggested measures to reduce pension expenditure are as under:
-
(a) Lateral transfer of Armed Forces personnel
to Central/State Governments, Central Armed Police Forces, State Police,
Municipal Bodies, PSU etc. This was recommended by VI CPC also.
(b) Downsizing the civil bureaucracy to reduce
revenue expenditure.
8.5 As a measure
of special recognition, is there a case to review the present benefits provided
to war widows?
8.5.1. As
a measure of special recognition, war widows are entitled to a variety of
benefits by Central/State Government/Armed Forces. However, scope for revision
of benefits does exist. This will further repose their faith and help overcome
their irreparable loss to some extent. The benefit currently entitled to war
widows from Central Government includes Liberalised Family Pension, Ex-Gratia
Concessions on Air and Rail Travel, reservation of seats in professional
institutes, priority in telephone connections, allotment of oil product
agencies under defence quote, educational concessions, Death-cum-retirement
Gratuity (DCRG) etc.
8.5.2. The
suggested revision of present benefits to war widows should include the
following: -
(a) Liberalised Family Pension. It
should be exempted from income tax.
(b) Ex-Gratia. The war widows are largely dependent on this award for being
able to provide for the cost of living life with dignity. Therefore, it needs
to be enhanced to a substantial amount to cater for sharp increase in cost of
living. Through this amount the family who has been left bereft of their
breadwinner can comfortably discharge the familial responsibilities. The amount
should also be exempted from income tax.
(c) Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity. DCRG to the maximum extent should be payable
to war widows. There should be no restriction on the maximum payable with
respect to the number of years of service put in.
8.5.3. In
addition, continuation of certain in-service benefits like Children Education
Allowance (CEA)/Hostel Subsidy and Leave Travel Concession which directly
impact the welfare of war-widows is recommended. The above mentioned
suggestions, if implemented, would greatly serve a noble cause of looking after
the welfare of the war-widows whose husbands sacrificed their lives for the
nation in the line of duty.
8.6 As a
measure of special recognition, is there a case to review the present benefits
provided to disabled soldiers, commensurate to the nature of their
disability?
8.6.1. Persons
with disabilities are required to be given due recognition. Consequent to the
enactment of the Persons with Disability Act, 1995, its non-extension to Armed
Forces Personnel who are not entitled to disability element in cases where the
disability is not attributed to military service, has been highly
discriminatory. Recognising this discrimination, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
judgment of 29 Apr 14 has upheld a judgment of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT)
Chandigarh bench ruling that soldiers injured while on duly authorised leave
are entitled to grant of disability pension. While civil Government servants
cannot be compulsorily removed from Government service due to disability,
military personnel acquiring disability in cases not attributable to military
service are compulsorily thrown out. Hence, there is a need to review the
present benefits available to soldiers.
8.6.2. Some
of the recommended measures are as under: -
(a) Standard disability element to servicemen
on invalidment/retirement in the event of his/her acquiring any amount of
disability even in cases where the disability is not attributed to military
service.
(b) Higher rate of disability element in cases
attributable to military service.
(c) Higher rate of War injury Pension.
(d) While percentage based disability element
is being paid to post-2006 retirees, those who retired with disability prior to
2006 are being paid disability element on slab basis unlike civil Government
employees. Hence pre-2006 retirees should also be granted disability element on
percentage basis.
(e) The pre-2006 PMR cases should also be
granted Disability pension as the same not being extended to these retirees.
9. Allowances
9.1 Whether the
existing allowances need to be retained or rationalized in such a manner as to
ensure that salary structure takes care not only of the job profile but the
situational factors as well, so that the number of allowances could be at a
realistic level?
9.1.1. Need
to Rationalise Number of Allowances to Realistic Levels.
(a) Justification & Armed Forces viewpoint
on continuing with current range and scope of allowances have been provided in
response to Question 8.3 above.
(b) Notwithstanding the above, there does exist
a case to review an rationalise the range of allowances and broadband similar
allowances into one category, with a view to enhancing administrative
efficiency and procedural simplicity. This implies that allowances amongst the
three Services which are common in scope but with different nomenclature may be
clubbed with no change in applicability provisions.
(c) Following additional suggestions are made:
-
(i) In order to provide meaningful
compensation vide the allowances and for the remunerations to remain relevant,
it is imperative that the allowances be reviewed with increase in inflation.
Following options may ne considered: -
(aa) Option I. Every time DA is increased by a particular percentage, the allowances
should also be increased by the same percentage.
(ab) Option II. Allowances be enhanced by 50% every time the DA rates
increase by 50%.
(ii) To reduce establishment expenditure and to
promote efficiency in the administration, there is a need to simplify the
procedure of payment of various allowances.
The cost of such administrative procedures is likely to outweigh the
actual amount of allowance and hence bulk of the allowances need to be paid
automatically.
(iii) There are certain emoluments linked to DA
(e.g. Classification Allowance), which need to be replaced with grant of
additional increments in the applicable pay band.
(iv) There is a large number of allowances
admissible to government employees which certainly needs to be rationalised. However
the significance of the allowances as a compensation/motivation is diminishing
over time. This is due to the fact that total emoluments component attributed
to allowances is reducing compared to pay because while pay is generally
improved by a factor of three, allowances are just doubled. For example, an
allowance of Rs 100 was admissible to an employee drawing Basic Pay of Rs 1000,
after two pay commissions the basic pay would reach Rs 9000 while the allowance
would remain at Rs 400. The allowance thus reduces from 10% to about 4.5% of
basic pay after two pay commissions. There is a need to give similar
enhancements in pay and allowances.
9.2 What should
be the principles to determine payment of House Rent Allowance?
9.2.1. The
HRA is authorised as a percentage of basic pay for all employees. The
enhancement of HRA is 3% per year which is the same as the annual increment.
Since inflation always outpaces the annual increment, it becomes increasingly
difficult to balance actual rent with HRA. As DA is a good and accepted norm of
measuring inflation for employees and it will be appropriate if the HRA is paid
as a percentage of Basic Pay + Dearness Allowance.
9.2.2. Principles
for Payment of House Rent Allowance (HRA).
(a) The rates of HRA should correlate to the
existing market rates of rent. It should satisfy the principle of “Adequacy and
Sufficiency.”
(b) The classification of cities and towns for
the purpose of HRA should factor the contemporary demographic migration trends,
and rates stipulated accordingly.
(c) The structure of HRA (slab based or
percentage based) should be arrived at after due sensitivity analysis is
conducted of the gap between existing market rate rents and HRA rates.
(d) Defence Forces Personnel should be entitled
to select ‘Anchor Stations’ besides the Selected Place of Residence
(SPR) for the purpose of claiming HRA on account of children education while
the children are in Classes IX to XII. This is an urgent requirement as Defence
Forces Personnel are mostly posted in small towns/cities where quality
education facilities do not exist. The individual is either forced to shift his
family to his place of posting and put his children at a disadvantage or keep
his family in his SPR with no HRA admissible to him. Concept of Anchor Stations
with admissibility of HRA in Anchor Stations will resolve this problem.
(e) Rates of HRA should be adequate to enable
hiring of accommodations as per status in a given city or place of duty.
(f) HRA should be made inflation proof and
fully exempt from
income tax.
10. Pension
10.1 The retirement benefits
of all Central Government employees appointed on or after 1.1.2004 a re covered
by the New Pension Scheme (NPS). What has been the experience of the NPS in the
last decade?
10.1. No
comments offered as NPS is not applicable to Armed Forces personnel.
10.2 As far as
pre-1.1.2004 appointees are concerned, what should be the principles that
govern the structure of pension and other retirement benefits?
10.2.1. The
principles that govern the structure of pension and other retirement benefits
for pre-1.1.2004 appointees should conform to the extant pension rules.
11.
Strengthening the public governance system
11.1 The 6th
CPC recommended upgrading the skills of the Group D employees and placing them
in Group C over a period of time. What has been the experience in this
regard?
11.1.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces
11.2 In what
way can Central Government organizations functioning be improved to make them
more efficient, accountable and responsible? Please give specific suggestions
with respect to:
a)
Rationalisation of staff strength and more productive deployment of available
staff;
b)
Rationalisation of processes and reduction of paper work; and c) Economy in
expenditure.
11.2.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces.
12. Training/ building competence
12.1 How would
you interpret the concept of “competency based framework”?
12.1.1. The
provisions for undergoing career enhancement courses abroad as applicable to
Civil Services officers should be extended to Armed Forces too, in addition to
basic/specified professional course currently being conducted within the
Services.
12.2 One of the
terms of reference suggests that the Commission recommend appropriate training
and capacity building through a competency based framework.
a) Is the
present level of training
at various stages of a person's career considered adequate? Are there gaps that
need to be filled, and if so, where?
b) Should it be
made compulsory that each civil service officer should in his career span
acquire a professional qualification? If so, can the nature of the study, time
intervals and the Institution(s) whose qualification are acceptable, all be
stipulated?
c) What other
indicators can best measure training and capacity building for
personnel in your organization? Please suggest ways through which capacity
building can be further strengthened?
12.2.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces.
13. Outsourcing
13.1 What has
been the experience of outsourcing at various levels of Government and is there
a case for streamlining it?
13.1.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces.
13.2 Is there a
clear
identification of jobs that can be outsourced?
13.2.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces
14. Regulatory Bodies
14.1 Kindly
list out the Regulators set up under Acts of Parliament, related to your
Ministry/ Department. The total number of personnel on rolls (Chairperson and
members + support personnel) may be indicated.
14.1.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces
14.2 Regulators
that may not qualify in terms of being set up under Acts of Parliament but
perform regulatory functions may also be listed. The scale of pay for
Chairperson /Members and other personnel of such bodies may be indicated.
14.2.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces
14.3 Across the
Government there are a host of Regulatory bodies set up for various purposes.
What are your suggestions regarding emoluments structure for Regulatory
bodies?
14.3.1. Not
applicable to Armed Forces.
15. Payment of Bonus
One of the
terms of reference of the 7th Pay Commission is to examine the existing schemes
of payment of bonus. What are your suggestions and observations in this
regard?
15.1. The system of
grant of bonus should continue as hitherto fore and provisions applicable to
Civil Services should equally apply to Defence Forces.
* * * * * *
Tele:
23011257
C/7026/VIIth
CPC/Vol-I 12
Jun 2014
ADJUTANT GENERAL’S
BRANCH
[Tri Services Pay
Staff (TRIPAS]
TERMS OF REFERENCE 7TH
CPC
REVIEW OF EXISTING
ALLOWANCES PAID TO DEFENCE PERSONNEL
1. Refer
to MoD ID No. 1(3)2014/D (Pay/Services) dated 03 Jun 2014.
2. The para-wise
replies to observations made as per above quoted note are appended below: -
(a) The
Armed Forces Rank structure is spread over three Groups i.e. Officers (Gazetted
Class I), JCOs (Gazetted Class II) and Other Ranks (ORs). Hence, for ease of understanding, allowances
extended to these three Groups have been shown separately. It is pertinent to
bring out that there are many allowances which are applicable only to a single
category/group i.e. Kit Maintenance Allowance (KMA), Qualification Pay,
Hospitality Allowance etc are applicable to Officers, whereas Classification
Allowance, Airworthiness certificate Allowance etc are applicable only to
JCOs/ORs. Also, mutually exclusive allowances out of which only one allowance
can be drawn at a time with same rates have been placed together i.e. Officer
getting Flying Allowance in Navy will not get Submarine allowance
concurrently.
(b) The
list of allowances has been scrutinised to ensure that no allowance has been
missed out. Diving/Diving Attendance allowances have now been listed at S No.
32. Updated list of allowances is annexed.
(c) The
data in respect of Flight Charges Allowance has been re-checked & found
correct (Rs 400 p.m. for JCOs and Rs 250 p.m. for ORs). However, rates in
respect of Hospitality Grant admissible to Cos of Col & eq/Lt Col & eq
rank had been inadvertently missed out and updated list is now annexed.
(d) As brought out
in para 2 (a) above, tables of three categories have been made for ease of
understanding only.
(e) Data
regarding Columns 11 to 14 are under compilation. The process is likely to take
some time and hence it has been scheduled to be submitted alongwith JSM.
However, if ready, it shall be submitted earlier.
(f) CPC has sought
information only in respect of allowances in cash or kind and examples given
vide MoD letter under reference do not fall under the said category.
3.
Further,
it is also clarified that no other allowances other than those mentioned in the
annexed list are admissible to Defence Personnel.
4. For information
and further necessary action.
Sd/-----------------
(V S Chauhan)
Commander
Director, TRIPAS
Encls: as
stated above
MOD – D
(Pay/Services), Sena Bhawan, New Delhi – 11
Copy to: -
APCC Room No.
1, Sena Bhawan, New Delhi – 11
7th
CPC (Navy), A Block Hutments
AFPCC, Air
HQ (RK Puram), West Block VI, New Delhi – 66.
* * * * * *
Please note the Annex referred to above (table of allowances) has
not been included in the hope that updated tables, including Columns 11 to 14,
would be in the JSM, when received.
HAPPY DIWALI
