Wednesday 30 April 2014

Rank Pay and OROP

Informed sources indicate that MoD has sent a file to MoF with a draft amendment or corrigenda to its letter of 27 Dec 12 about the implementation of orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 04 Sep 12.

This file reportedly, repeat reportedly, contains incorporation of the Opinion dated 03 Sep 13 of the Ld Attorney General for India i.e applicability of the Hon'ble Court's order is to be with effect from 1.1.1986 and not as on 1.1.1986 and deduction of Rank Pay for fixation of pay in the 5th has to be reversed i.e with effect from 1.1.1996 and its effect on re-fixation wef 1.1.2006.

So, which horse will win - amendment/corrigenda on Rank Pay restoration or implementation order on OROP?

Two issues will be left to be decided

Either by the Hon'ble Court - whether there was a minimum pay for each rank recommended by the 4th CPC and whether the ceiling of the integrated pay scale needs to raised to the extent of restoration of amount of Rank Pay

or 

By the Ld Attorney General, if the Service HQ SoC dated 25 Nov 13 forwarded by MoD to LA (Def) has been put up for the opinion of the Ld AG.

Slowly move the wheels.........




George Bernard Shaw is quoted to have said, “Take care to get what you like or you will be forced to like what you get.”

*        *        *        *        *

Let me start by assuring readers of this post that I am a Confirmed Chronic Cynic. Readers, intelligent ones at that, know that a cynic is one who knows the cost of everything (well, almost) but the value of nothing. So, please let this scroll across your mind as you read and you might be objective in your criticism and suggestions (which are the aims of this piece) …….

My impression, after a chat with Comdt CDM a few weeks ago,  was that the seminar of 05 Mar 14 was more by way of stimulating an intelligent debate, learning first hand the benefits and pitfalls of past presentations to Pay Commissions, recording them for posterity, and by being less dogmatic about who lost and by how much. 

Separately, I was also told by “sources” that a prominent member of the 6th CPC is still upset by the tone & tenor of Armed Forces presentations/presenters and, therefore, did not wish to attend the seminar. The loss is of the audience and the Armed Forces, for we might have gained a better insight from the “man in the ring.” 

Now that 7 CPC has sent an epistle and a questionnaire “seeking the considered views of all stakeholders is enclosed. The response of your Ministry to this Questionnaire is sought. I shall be grateful if the replies are furnished to the Commission on or before 10th May, 2014, so as to enable the Commission to take them into account as part of its examination of the issues that it is mandated to address. The reply may be sent to Post Box No. 4599, Hauz Khas P.O, New Delhi 110 016, and in the case of email to secy-7cpc@nic.in.” 

The Bureaucracy

We, Armed Forces personnel too often, if not always, compare/base our “profit and loss” statements post every CPC vis-à-vis mainly the IAS, which is “the bureaucracy” to most of us. David Gilmour wrote in his book titled ‘The Ruling Caste’ that the bureaucracy is “more obsessed with status and promotion,” though it may be of little consolation to the “status first” promoters of the Armed Forces.

Any affirmation, if two more were needed, of the bureaucracy destroying the myth of their efficiency and self-sacrificial esprit-de-corps are (1) the number of retired Secretaries selected on extended tenures as Advisers to PM, FM etc (and none, thank God, so far, to the RM) and (2) the selective implementation of the Non-Functional Upgradation – upgraded with cash payout the because some one else, more deserving perhaps, in the same batch had been promoted two years earlier and started to earn more. There is always the self-righteous justification that everyone who has to be given NFU has to meet some stringent (?) criteria but who decides whether they really do? That there isn’t a single protest that I have read of, on the World Wide Web, is proof of the pudding of my statement!  

But with a higher percentage, compared to the Armed Forces, rising to the level of Addl Secy, what was the need for NFU? Was it to offset the MSP? Something like NFU as financial comfort and consolation for inability to match some one else’s merit; MSP for risking one’s own life (and being kicked around too) and not because someone else has risked/is risking his/her life to defend the Nation’s sovereignty and integrity!  

Many CPCs’ include a statement in their preamble that an edge must be maintained for the IAS, because it has always been so (the “precedent syndrome”?) Is it, “the problem was that ICS officers were expected to be experts in everything but were trained to be experts in nothing” (ibid, page 113).

Is it any different today? Just three examples –

Read the file notings of DS (E.III.A, MoF/DoE) and his interpretive query about confining the benefits of the Apex Court’s order in IA No. 9 of 2010 to similarly situated officers of the Army because in his reading “only Army officers appear to be the litigants.” How is it he, the expert, not comprehend that Rank Pay was a matter that affected officers of all three Services?   Even Lord Curzon, if he were to be resurrected would be “astonished by a system in which proposals circulated the departments and returned to their starting point many months later, garnished with an array of minutes from Secretaries and under-secretaries who revelled in dialectics and had perfected the art of ‘the put down” (ibid page 214).

Retired Secretaries (Sarvashri Rangarajan, Shome etc) are appointed as Advisers to the Govt. Does that mean that the IAS incumbents headed by the Cabinet Secretary, tacitly acknowledge that there is comparative lack of intellectual capacity and expertise in the incumbents that compels the Govt to recall retired IAS officers? Why isn’t the IAS association protesting the employment of these Advisers, like it did when IAS officers of Andhra Pradesh were called in for questioning by CBI in the Jaganmohan Reddy case?
 
Retired DsGP have been appointed advisers (like for anti-naxal role in Jharkhand) but what about the resultant question mark on competency/capability on the incumbent DGP and his officers?

Is the bureaucracy, to quote Gilmour, “reconciled to a dominant race which holds all high offices in its hands and treats others with patronising kindness, professing to teach them everything,” (ibid page 17)? Or may be the bureaucracy has taken, very seriously, the words of Lord Mayo “that we are all (British) gentlemen engaged in the magnificent work of governing an inferior race,” (ibid, page 19) and are trying to teach the lesser children of the bureaucratic God something!

It is blindingly obvious that “usurpation of authority without concomitant acceptance of responsibility” is the motto of the bureaucracy for “they might have had the ‘paper knowledge’ of a particular subject but seldom had the practical experience” (ibid, page 215).  

On the other hand, even after the only debacle faced by the Armed Forces (in 1962), how many former Chiefs of the Armed Forces have been appointed advisers to the RM? Or are the incumbents worthy of their appointments (though there is a different school of thought that always sees the dark cloud and not the silver lining!)     

The Mission of Armed Forces

The primary mission of the Armed Forces, which comprises Officers and Other Ranks (since there are severe objections to the term PBOR), is that the Indian Armed Forces is to ensure national security and unity, defending the nation from external aggression and threats, and maintaining peace and security within its borders. They conduct humanitarian rescue operations during natural calamities and other disturbances, and can also be requisitioned by the government to cope with internal threats.   

But does that give us the right or self-righteous not to look at ourselves first, having sacrificed lives, limbs, blood, sweat, and tears?

Status or Parity?

Now let us turn to the lament that the IAS is eroding the status of, and parity with, the Armed Forces and we are ready to cut off our noses (remove ranks of Lt Col and Brig) to achieve parity. Time has a harsh answer to this continuing bewailing of one’s fate. It is called mockery.

Armed Forces leadership can change this negative mind-set by being clear-headed and utilising the distinct and nationally well-respected ethos, comparative integrity and honesty, to place genuine requirements before the Government or the 7 CPC. Veterans may have many suggestions but the genuine ones need to be separated from the self-serving.

Indian Armed Forces have won all wars (and lost one thanks to we know who), it is because of our strength of character, bravery, and initiative. Let us not dishonour the Victoria Cross, George Cross, PVC, MVC, VrC and other gallantry award winners by stopping pitying ourselves. If Armed Forces hierarchy stands up for the legitimate, environment dictated rights and remunerations, nobody can deny them unless they wish to place themselves at risk.

Even acidic op editorials by a Chief Editor whose major contribution to the Armed Forces, by his own admission, is building a war memorial in Chandigarh, did not stop the three Chiefs from stand up for justice just about half a decade ago. Making one’s emotion laden views heard, or read or talked about is one thing; proposing sensible solutions is altogether in a higher (and rational) plane.

Promotions, Steep Pyramidal Structure and other things

Having had the benefit of reading many disgruntled opinions and views, on many blogs and the ubiquitous Chatroll, against those who were promoted (a minority) by those who were not (the majority), I draw attention to Gilmour again about the age-old malady, “Promotions inevitably caused bitterness amongst people who did not get what they felt they deserved. There were charges of favouritism and vindictiveness against senior officers on account of their selection,” (ibid page 219). Many of those affected appear not to realise that post-1962 mass inductions were “a decision that eased the immediate…problem but quickly led to a promotion block for those recruited subsequently” (ibid, page 221).

And, as for those with the recurring chorus "No one can help the Armed Forces, if we were/are like this," let up stop bemoaning our (sad?) fate and do something fast, strong, and positive. Exaggerated self-pity becomes a façade for personal advancement. Many of us have steadily declined to become humbugs and hypocrites. Some of us have proceeded to the next stage of self-legitimising and become those who will brook no resistance to the self-promotion of our own sense of injustice.

Look at the upper echelons of the Army’s officer cadre [Source: CDM - De-linking of Pay Scales from Ranks]:  Lt Gens – 90; Maj Gens 295 (or about 32% promoted to Lt Gen); Brig – 1117 (or 37% promoted to Maj Gen); Cols 4762 (or 23% promoted to Brig); Lt Col 9996 (or approximately 50% promoted to Col). The ratio in the Navy and Air Force is hardly different. The promotion policy in the Armed Forces, including for the COAS or equivalent requires three names to be put up (or 33% chances of promotion).     

There are only 43 lieutenant generals on active duty in the U.S. Army (strength about 11 lakhs). Fewer than one-half percent (<0.5%) of commissioned officers make it to the top three ranks (source: http://usmilitary.about.com/od/army/a/armyltgen.htm.)

Compare with the table provided for the IPS [Source: CDM - De-linking of Pay Scales from Ranks]:  DGP – 54; ADGP – 202 (or 25% promoted to DGP); IG – 499 (or 50% promoted to ADGP); DIG – 496 (or 99.9% promoted to IG); and SP – 1328 (or 25% promoted to DIG).

Is there a suggestion that there should be more in the ranks of Brig/Maj Gen and Lt Gen (and equivalents)? Making for fatter (no allusion to the girth lines), softer (ditto) and, older (with related ailments) Armed Forces to get rid of the ‘pyramidal’ problem? 

In a recent meeting called by a Veteran for ‘strategising’ about what we should place before the PARC (to my cynical mind, an unlikely event), I was aghast to hear a just retired two star officer bemoan that he had 16 superseded officers in his Sub-area HQ, who clocked in their attendance and took off for the golf course. I asked the General why he did not use his Command & Control to discipline those 16. I was told, “Sir, you know how it is. They don’t listen!” I told him that when I was promoted to take over as CO of Air HQ Comn Sqn, there were 17 officers who were senior to me, including the senior-most who was 10 courses my senior. They knew their responsibilities and accountability and I knew mine. And we flew VVIPs and VIPs all over the country with none of the seniors pushing off to play golf after reporting for work!
  
What, if some one can enlighten my feeble mind, is the solution to the ‘steep pyramid’ problem? I may be looking in the wrong places, because I have yet to come across a solution to the steep pyramid that will not dilute the responsibilities or cause more of the abstract ‘command & control’ problems. Elsewhere I have posted the Bagga Commission/AVSC recommendations and debate, which spurs the comment of an anonymous US official, “We just have to keep doing what we are doing and hope it takes us somewhere.” But what if it leads to a place that no one wants to go? Could the Services, in 20:20 hindsight have had the wisdom of the Navy in not implementing the recommendations?

Or would votaries of the “get rid of the steep pyramidal problem” suggest that Lt Gens, Maj Gens and Brigs execute the charter of duties one rank lower (and dent the WoP some more?); Or maybe, as in utopia, bring down the retirement ages by 2 years for a third of the Lt Gens, Maj Gens and Brigs so younger officers will replace them?    

While we are fixated with officers, let us not forget the Other Ranks. To start with, take a look at their terms of service, their service conditions, their promotion prospects, ACP notwithstanding. When was the last cadre review done? 2009! Five years ago?

The status of JCOs, NCOs, and soldiers has declined. Assistants in AFHQ services are placed in the grade pay of Rs 4600, which is equal to a Subedar, whereas till 6th pay commission, their pay scales were below that of a Nb Sub. It is a known but discreetly neglected fact that all JCOs in Indian army are group B gazetted officers, and by placing an Asst, which is a non-gazetted civilian post above that of a JCO in Indian Army, we are seeing the first stage of the erosion of the Other Ranks.

Why do the Other Ranks have three Groups and different pay scales between X Group  Rs 1400 extra) and Y & Z Groups? Officers of the Arms and Services have the same pay scales, except for AMC, ADC, and RVC? One may trot out that the entry qualifications are different for different groups but then aren’t there Engineers and post-graduates (in Meteorology etc) in the Officer Corps who do not have separate pay scales?    

Finally & In Conclusion

OK, I am ready with the Kevlar body suit and armour! My brains, and other organs or what is left of them, have been promised to the nearest CH!!

E & O E

At the risk of being shot at (and not having a 56” chest!), here are my opinions/suggestions/recommendations for those intelligent minds in the Veterans community.

I - Warrant of Precedence (WoP), Status and all that

I regret (or should I be proud?) to admit that the cynicism (and its corollary ‘name dropping’) is due to seeing, meeting, and flying Presidents, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Defence Ministers etc for well over a decade. So I should have recused myself from expressing an opinion but a cynic is one who knows the cost of……

Personally, I feel that "WoP” or “status" is an issue of who sits closest to the Supreme Commander on 26 Jan and 29 Jan and (is in the frame before the contingent commander shouts “saamne dekh") or to the PM at the Red Fort on 15 Aug.

In the WoP 1937 for India there was just the Viceroy and then the members of his Council. There was a different WoP in the UK, where the Viceroy was not No.1. Therefore, bemoaning “Dropping down the WoP” does not appear to have taken into consideration that No. 2, 3 and 4 are Vice President, PM and Deputy PM/Foreign head of Government followed by the Governors, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers of the states, Lt Governors, Ministers of State with independent charge, and Ministers of State etc (not necessarily in that order) before the Chiefs figure.  

II - Steep Pyramidal Structure

Unlike the civil services, where medical fitness is not mandatory either for carrying out  duties nor age-related slowing of the body (and mind) a constraint, the Armed Forces need to place medical fitness as close as possible to rational thinking, initiative and innovativeness.

So what do the Armed Forces do with those with the slowing body and increasing ailments except to retire personnel at lower ages though they are, by civilian standards of work, adequately fit?

Will flattening the pyramid (or flat organisation, as I hear it is called) help? If so, how? Today, having implemented the Bagga Committee recommendations and subsequent AVSC implementation, are the Armed Forces better off? Leaner, meaner, younger?

To me, a chronic cynic, it appears that ranks in the Army and Air Force have been diluted with adverse consequences because of below-par number of inductions. Soon the pyramid will flatten itself into a sheet because more officers, and their uncles, standard of performance notwithstanding, will have to be promoted to fill in those Bagga/AVSC vacancies! The day isn’t far off when top Armed Forces officers take to the AFT or Courts to be appointed Army Cdr equivalents and Chiefs just like DGPs are doing in many states!    

While fixated with the Officers cadre, are we forgetting that the other ranks did not benefit from any Bagga Committee or AVSC? That many PBOR (in the Air Force, at least) now take between 20 and 24 years to achieve a Warrant rank (equivalent of a Nb Sub) in many non-technical trades? Don’t they have a pyramidal structure that needs some attention (and drastic surgery?)   

Amalgamate the different groups in the Other Ranks into one with a common basic compensation package. Add allowances for qualifications required for different technical qualifications or higher educational qualifications (i.e, JCOs in the Army Education Corps etc).  

What the Armed Forces direly need is a cadre review by a professional “no-stakes” organisation to decide on what should be the optimal command and control structure and commensurate manpower. For that, there are two pre-requisites – The Government spelling out the National Aim and consequently the Ministry of Defence clearly enunciating the Military aim. A speaker at the recent CDM seminar bemoaned that fact that we have neither! The RM’s Op Directive is not enough.  

III - Separation of Command & Control aspects from Personal Remuneration

Keep ranks for command and control requirements only; same as the bureaucracy has its hierarchy of US, DS, Director, DG (if required), JS, Addl Secy, Spl Secy, and Secy.

If the intention is to have lean, mean, and young Armed Forces, then first make an objective assessment of how the military aim would be met and how much manpower would be required. Review the charter of duties of all designations from Army Cdr & PSO downwards to give respect to the rank of the officer. Remember, by eliminating ranks like Lt Col and Brig because there is no parity, one only tends to devalue/dilute the ranks of Col and Maj Gen. I know from personal example. As a newly commissioned officer, I was detailed for Orderly Officer duties which were earlier carried out by the Warrant Ranks. Later on Sqn Ldr carried out Base ops duties, assigned earlier to Fg Offrs and Flt Lts.  

IV – Pay, Allowances, and Perquisites (Personal Remuneration Package)

Delink rank from Personal Remuneration Package.
Separate remuneration scales or pay bands from ranks and link it to years of service.
For the same numbers years of service an Armed Forces officer would get the same pay and allowances and perquisites as IAS/IPS/Gp 'A' officer.

For the same numbers years of service an Armed Forces Other Ranks would get the same pay and allowances and perquisites as Gp 'B' civilians.
Calculate the new CPC pay by the following formula: -
Basic Pay as on 31 Dec 2015 x cost inflation index (CII) of 2015 divided by cost inflation index of 2006 (year of CPC)
i.e Rs 40000 x CII of 2015 say 1110 = Rs 44400000 divided by 519 = Rs 85540.13 rounded off to next 10 rupees i.e Rs 85550
Grade Pay and MRP (Military Risk Pay) be increased in the above manner.
MoF may consider announcing the CII on 01 Apr of each year so that increments could be linked to the CII and paid in the financial year, facilitating better income tax collection.
Note: Please see added element of Performance Incentive for Select List promotees from Col and above as differentiator below.
V – Pension

Pension norms for Armed Forces officers will be the same as for IAS/IPS/Gp ‘A’ Services.

Pension norms for Other Ranks will be the same as for civilian Gp ‘B’ services.

VI - Performance Incentive for Select/Selection List Promotees

To ensure that ‘time scale’ increment does not detract from desired minimum performance, institute a Performance Incentive (PI) of 15% of the Basic pay for officers placed in Select(ion) List by Promotion Boards and promoted. Minimum performance required to earn PI would be assessed for each Selection List promotion by Promotion Boards. Payment of PI (at 15% of the Basic pay drawn) should be automatic from the date of being found fit for those selected.

Anomalies in the PI scheme or any allegations of wrong assessment could be appealed to and placed before the Anomalies Resolution Committee comprising the COAS/ equivalent, one Army Cdr/equivalent, and AG/PSO/equivalent for resolution.    

VII - Anomalies Resolution Board (ARB)

If a Committee of Secretaries (CoS) can decide matters concerning the IAS/IPS/Gp ‘A’ services and alleviate the resentment and inter-cadre grievances, why not Armed Forces officers in MoD in decision making levels will mitigate the prevailing resentment that they are ignored and discriminated against? If meaningful changes do not happen, resentment builds up (as it has now) and the present adverse media reports are proof enough. Inclusion of Armed Forces personnel at decision making levels of the MoD is a matter of national self-interest as well as justice.

So, MoD, instead of referring each and every anomaly to the CoS, should constitute an Anomalies Resolution Board, like the Railways Board, for conflict resolution. ARB would comprise Defence Secretary as Chairperson, the three Vice Chiefs as fulltime members, Secretary ESW, FA (DS), the Legal Adviser (Defence) and DGAFMS (for disability benefit related appeals) as ex-officio members utilising the CoSC secretariat for the paperwork.

ARB would meet once a month to

Consider issues placed before it and review progress on past decisions. In any case all issues should be resolved within three months from the date an issue has been raised. For example, on the NFU, MoD replies to an RTI application that the information cannot be disclosed under Section 8 of the RTI Act 2005 because the matter is still under consideration and four years have lapsed!

          Exchange information/notes to improve the Civil-Military discourse.

The decision of the ARB can be challenged only in a High Court or the Supreme Court.

VIII - Litigation & Costs thereof

Many cases are being filed by the MoD or Service HQ against decisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal, High Courts, and Supreme Court. A directive (since withdrawn and awaiting disclosure from DESW despite being paid additional charges of photocopying 3 months ago!) that Service HQ must file appeals etc appeared to “save the Public Exchequer” by keeping the Govt’s law officers “more” employed!

It must be made mandatory that, for all cases to be filed against orders of AFT/High Courts/Supreme Court, a legal certificate of fitness to file by at least the Legal Adviser (Defence) be obtained and placed before the ARB for final decision.

Cost of filing cases contradicting the advice of the LA (Def) or ARB and losing the cases must be paid by the official who initiated the move to file the case despite advice to the contrary. If a serving/Veteran petitioner/respondent pays costs for frivolous litigation, why not the irresponsible Govt officer?    

IX - Permanent Risk Related Allowances/Pay

Risk related allowance pay for Armed Forces would be for duties such as CI Ops, Flying risk, Submarine, High Seas, and MARCOS etc. This would have exemption from income tax just as insurance is tax-exempted etc. Increases may be proportional to the increase of CII in base year (2015) to the current year

X - Temporary Risk Related Allowances/Pay (TRAP)

Armed Forces units being tasked over and above their peace time duties with CI Ops, Spl Ops, anti-piracy duties, posting to high altitudes above 4000 metres AMSL, Aid to Civil power in Law & Order situations, etc be paid TRAP for the duration the units/personnel are tasked on these duties.
   
XI - Cost of Living Compensation (CLC)

Instead of an annual increment, all Armed Forces personnel as well as civilian employees and pensioners should be paid a Cost of Living Compensation (CLC) equal to the increase in the cost inflation index. The rate of inflation intimated by RBI would be the benchmark.

XII - Ordinary Pension

Ordinary pension be increased to the following percentages of last pay drawn: -

Age of Pensioner
Percentage
Reasons/remarks
35-45
75%  
(i) Non-fulfilment of Govt’s assurance on lateral Absorption,

(ii) Continuing liabilities of Children’s education, accn etc
45-55
60%  
-”-

XIII - Family Pension

Family pension is reduced from the prevailing 50% of last pay drawn of the pensioner on the mistaken belief that death of the pensioner reduces the expenditure of the family by 20%.

In actual fact, the expenditure increases because the family/widow has to pay the same local taxes and levies as well as pay for services of a driver (at Rs 300 for 4 hours being the minimum), handy-man etc, for chores that the pensioner performed before death.

Further, the pension of a pensioner is not reduced by 20% when his/her spouse passes away. Therefore, family pension be paid at rates indicated above.

XIV - Disability Pension

Broad banding of disability benefits is implemented.

Appeal against decisions of Disability Medical Boards may be arbitrated by/appealed to ARB for resolution. 

XV - Transfer Benefits

Personnel may be allowed one month’s remuneration as disturbance pay in addition to payment of actual costs of the transportation of household effects, including pets and vehicles. Production of bills be made mandatory (and in contradiction to what CDM proposes).

XVI - Leave Travel Benefits (LTB)

All personnel and families may be permitted LTB three times a year to their recorded place of permanent residence or a place at a lesser distance. The cost may be compensated on production of air/rail tickets. Air travel may be permitted by any airline subject to the fare not exceeding the fare(s) levied by Air India.

XVII – Institutionalised system of lateral Absorption
Institutionalise a system of lateral absorption across all levels. If a Lt Gen can be appointed to AFTs or head some study cell, or for that matter ex- bureaucrats and Chiefs go as Governors/Lt Governors/Ambassadors/High Commissioners/Advisers to Ministries (which anyway have a plethora of Secretary level officers) , why cannot a jawan  or JCO or Officer be absorbed in a Govt or PSU job?

XVIII - Re-employment in Government jobs

The Govt of India (GoI) assured the Armed Forces, in its approval of the recommendations of the 6th CPC, of lateral absorption of able personnel. The GoI reneged on its assurance stating that the Home Ministry has objections as if the Ministry is a different entity from the GoI. Those who opted for lateral absorption but did not get it due to such appalling decisions should be paid the last pay drawn as pension till the age of superannuation of the post for which he/she was eligible.

There should be no reduction in pension of Armed Forces Veterans on re-employment in govt jobs similar to other Central Government All India Services like the IAS not having this.

XIX   - Reduction of Wastage of Public Expenditure

Often payment of legitimate dues, even after clear orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in favour of Armed Forces appellants, serving or Veterans, are challenged/appealed against by MoD, citing the cost to the State Exchequer.

Do other large central organizations like Railways have such a dual monstrosity placed over them to carry out accounts and audit? Finance Commissioner is a member of the Railway Board but is under the Ministry of Finance and the Railway Board is directly responsible to the Railways Minister.

If Air Force and Navy can function on their own why can not the same structure be implemented in Army with prorated additional manpower?

There is one aspect that we some how need to highlight and that is the proliferation of a monster called the Defence Accounts Department, which started with a few CDAs to a humungous organization is now so full of PCsDA and CsDA. In late 1960s and early 1970s (when the Armed Forces were full strength) with CGDA as the head, following was the set up:
  • Army
    • CDA (O)
    • CDA (Pensions)
    • CDA (Western Command) at Meerut which shifted to Chandimandir  sometime in late 90s
    • CDA (Central command that Included Eastern Command) – later bifurcated
    • JCDA (Funds)
    • CDA (OR) which had under it PAOs (DCDA/ACDA Level) at training centres
    • Local Audit of units was done by LAOs who reported to CDA Commands
  • DCDA (Air Force)
  • CDA (Navy)
Let me illustrate with just one example.

Information (about 1000 pages) provided under the RTI Act 2005 by MoD, MoF/DoE and CGDA in just the Rank pay cases (Maj A K Dhanapalan Vs. UoI and later in UoI vs. Lt Col N K Nair & others) revealed that the laying down of an accounts policy and audit system of the Armed Forces is done by the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA), after a polite demur to its Competent Authority – the Financial Adviser (Defence Services) who sits in South Block, next to the MoD.

This Secretary, Defence/Finance–cum-Financial Adviser, Defence Services (FADS) in MoD is supposedly the “boss” of the CGDA. Under this Secretary-cum FADS there are several Addl FADS and hierarchy, whose role appears to be just acting as a liaison office between MoD, MoF/DoE, and CGDA.

In the Rank Pay matter, the CGDA operated as the policy maker as well as audit authority, as inferred by the photocopies of notings on files. Preparation of the DGL and norms for implementation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders in the Rank Pay case, as disclosed by CGDA in 255 pages of information, was dictated by CGDA and ‘rubber stamped’ by the Secy, Def/Fin or FADS. Not the other way around!

Every subsequent appeal/challenge to the Rank Pay cases filed by respondents/petitioners against UoI, and photocopies of notings thereof, contains nothing on policy or procedures by FADS but are replete with voluminous arguments by CGDA and supported by MoF/DoE, with just a minute/signature of the FADS or a JS/Addl DS.

The MoF/DoE even castigated the MoD (and obviously FADS) in its note dated 05 July 13 for not even preparing a draft reference of the matter to the Ld Attorney General for his opinion but forwarding the reference dated March 13 by the CGDA without a comment.

It is therefore recommended that either the post of Secy Def/Fin-FADS and the attached paraphernalia or the CGDA be abolished to save the Public Exchequer of hundreds of crores of rupees, which could be used for modernisation of the Armed Forces.   

*        *        *        *        *        *

Monday 28 April 2014

Muddying the Olive Green Waters, Again?



Muddying the Olive Green Waters, Again?

Source:  Force magazine
Age No Bar
Gen. V.K. Singh should ensure that he is remembered for things other than his age
Pravin Sawhney

I feel sorry for the mess that the army chief, General V.K. Singh has got himself into on his age controversy. If only he had not made the blunder of allowing his predecessor General Deepak Kapoor to determine his fortune, he would not have come to this vexed pass, and the army, the hallowed institution he heads, would have been spared the ridicule of media and apathy of bureaucrats in the defence ministry.

I have not met the chief on this matter, but given the numerous reports and interest in the issue, the search engine Google has a separate page titled ‘General V.K. Singh age’ with abundant hits. Whatever the outcome of the confrontation which has been joined, the chief can still make lemonade for the army from the lemon that it appears to have got.

It was an open and shut case. Between his matriculation certificate and the NDA form, the legal opinion and commonsense would accept the former. Without doubt, his date of birth is 10 May 1951. Why at the time of his promotion to the rank of Lt. General did he commit to being a year older? He says that in true military tradition while accepting General Kapoor’s ruling, he urged him to be fair. Why should anyone be fair to General Singh when he has been unfair to himself! Herein lies the problem and tongues are waging. It is being said that he accepted his superior’s diktat as he was scared of being passed over for the higher rank. Having written twice to the military secretary after becoming Lt General, why did he not insist on age clarification before becoming the Chief of Army Staff? Did he want his cake and eat it too?

He has embarked on a confrontationist path with no possible compromise. After the rejection of his contention by the defence ministry, he has put in a statuary complaint with the defence minister, A.K. Antony. The said part of his complaint appeals to the minister’s good sense, while the unsaid part informs him that General Singh’s case is legally strong.

This, the chief has garnered opinion from four retired Chief Justices of India and a former Attorney General. He even did an overreach by persuading 37 Members of Parliament to meet the Prime Minister to consider his case sympathetically; they were told that the army should remain apolitical.

In turning down his earlier application, the defence ministry had sought legal opinion from the law minister, who ruled that the general’s written commitment had sealed the matter. Why will Antony give a contrary verdict on the chief’s statuary complaint? Surely, he is not intimidated by the obvious: armed with legal opinions in his favour, the chief may approach the judiciary for justice. If indeed this happens, as the build-up of events suggests, there would be a lot of mess. Antony could do a Vishnu Bhagwat on V.K. Singh; or the army’s succession plan could suffer. Even if the chief was to get a year’s extension, how would the army gain? I am sure the chief would have thought about the lemon that the army would get in this show-down. Given the importance of personalised relationship, the defence ministry would sit over army files than move them. Reports suggest that the army’s modernisation plans for raising formations for the eastern front have been stumped; the sought for amount is being questioned by the defence ministry.

SC defers Army Chief General VK Singh age row case, slams govt

(Source: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/sc-defers-army-chief-general-vk-singh-age-row-case-slams-govt/226750-3.html)

Army Chief General Vijay Kumar Singh's petition on his date of birth has been adjourned by the Supreme Court till February 10, giving the General and the Central Government more time to resolve the controversy.
With the Supreme Court admitting General Singh's petition, the Army Chief has won round one of the battle. The apex court also criticised the government's handling of the controversy while directing the Attorney General of India to take instructions from the government on the December 30, 2011 order which fixed General Singh's date of birth as May 10, 1950. The court pointed out that there was no independent evaluation of General Singh's complaint.
The apex court said that the December 30 order relied on Attorney General Vahanvati's opinion given to the government and hence was not correct.
"We are of the prima facie view that decision making process of the government in disposing off General VK Singh's statutory complaint is vitiated. It seems that going to the Armed Forces Tribunal for the General may not be efficacious," the bench of Justices RM Lodha and HL Gokhale observed while pointing out that principles of natural justice were not followed in the matter.
The courtroom witnessed heated arguments with the Attorney General and the Solicitor General Rohinton F Nariman representing the Government of India while General Singh's lawyer was Uday Lalit.
The Supreme Court started by putting basic objections to the government on the stand that on July 21, 2011, it had determined General Singh's date of birth and on that order of the government, the General filed a statutory complaint and again, another order was passed on December 30, 2011.
Observing that the July 21 order was made on the opinion of the Attorney General and the December 30 opinion was again made on the opinion of the Attorney General, the Supreme Court said that this was against the principle of natural justice because the government had again sought the opinion of the person who was committed to one particular opinion.
Thirdly, the court also expressed the opinion that if the General was to go to the Armed Forces Tribunal or the High Court, it may not be efficacious because considering the Armed Forces Tribunal, there are Army officers who happen to be the General's junior, and then again there will be a conflict of interest.
So the Supreme Court took the view that the only option left for the General was to fight it out in the highest court of the land.
Before concluding its observations, the court directed the Attorney General to take a clear stand as to what the Government of India was going to do with the December 30, 2011 order and if they are going to withdraw it.
"Because we (the court) feel that principles of natural justice were not followed and whatever happens, please come back and tell us on Friday,” the court added.
Sources close to General Singh said that he was extremely happy with the Supreme Court's observations.
In an unprecedented move General Singh had on January 16, 2012 moved the Supreme Court to resolve the controversy over his date of birth.
There are two sets of General Singh's date of birth in the Army's records leading to a controversy and putting a question mark over when he would retire and the officer succeeding him to lead the 1.13 million strong fighting force.
General Singh contends that May 10, 1951 should be treated as his actual date of birth as it was mentioned in his matriculation certificate but the Defence Ministry has rejected it as May 10, 1950 is the date entered in his Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) form for the National Defence Academy.
The Adjutant Branch, Army's official record keeper, also records May 10, 1951 as General Singh date of birth and the same is mentioned in his Army ID card, driving licence, passport and other service records. Even all his Annual Confidential Reports since 1970 show May 10, 1951 as his date of birth.
But the Military Service Branch has another set of the General's date of birth showing that he was born on May 10, 1950 and this is the date that the Ministry of Defence has been insisting on as being official.
V.K. Singh makes final bid to derail Army succession
VISHAL THAPAR New Delhi | 19th Apr 2014
The first and the loudest to complain against news of the outgoing Manmohan Singh government initiating the process to select a new Army chief was General V.K. Singh, now transitioning to full-time politics as a BJP Lok Sabha contestant.
The protest was strange, particularly coming from a former Army chief himself. The long-established Indian tradition in appointing service chiefs is about respecting seniority, irrespective of which government is in power. Supersessions are a rare exception. In fact, Gen V.K. Singh himself is a beneficiary of this tradition. He was made Army chief on 1 April 2010, despite grave reservations expressed on record by his predecessor, Gen Deepak Kapoor, whose apprehensions were borne out by V.K. Singh's tumultuous and very controversial tenure.
Now, after the calm of V.K. Singh's successor Gen Bikram Singh's tenure, which is due to end in July, the succession tumult is returning to haunt the Army.
The current Vice-Chief, Lt Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag, will be the senior-most Army officer when Bikram Singh retires, and by dint of seniority and tradition, is the front-runner for Army chief, no matter which government is selecting a chief. And unlike the recent case of the Navy, where the senior-most Vice-Admiral, Shekhar Sinha was overlooked on grounds of "moral responsibility" following a spate of accidents under his command, there's no such obstacle in Suhag's path.
General V.K. Singh's objections would, thus, appear curious, unless seen in context. In case Suhag is discredited as a UPA favourite or otherwise ruled out, the next-in-line for appointment as chief is the Southern Army Commander, Lt Gen Ashok Singh, who is related to V.K. Singh through marriage. V.K. Singh's daughter is married to Ashok Singh's son.
While in office, Gen V.K. Singh targeted both Bikram Singh and Suhag with a ferocity which stunned even the biggest cynics in the Army. V.K. Singh not just disapproved of both Bikram and Suhag, but his tenure coincided with determined campaigns to derail the careers of both these officers who were in line to succeed him.
Curiously, Ashok Singh would be the beneficiary if either Bikram or Suhag's careers were aborted.
Training his guns first at Bikram, V.K. Singh had openly slammed the succession chain, which his supporters claimed had been rigged to put Sikhs as Army chiefs (incidentally, Suhag is not a Sikh). He pointed fingers at former Army chief, Gen J.J. Singh, incidentally the first Sikh Army chief, for having patronised a communal succession chain, also insinuating that this had the blessings of the Sikh Prime Minister. This charge was strongly denied by Gen J. J. Singh, who, ironically put V.K. Singh in the succession chain by promoting him Lt Gen in 2006. The baseline for an officer to come in contention for the post of Army chief is promotion to the rank of Lt General. Thereafter, how far an officer progresses is a factor of his age relative to those of his peers. There is no deep selection after promotion to 3-star rank (Lt General). Bikram Singh was promoted Lt General during the tenure of General Deepak Kapoor, who was not known to see eye-to-eye with J. J. Singh.
It was even loudly alleged by V.K. Singh's supporters that Bikram Singh was related to the Prime Minister through his wife. This was factually incorrect.
The campaign against Bikram Singh was given a distinctly communal overtone, but Bikram Singh was to face even more vicious charges. It was alleged, first by whisper and innuendo and then through a PIL, that he faked an encounter in Kashmir. The PIL was filed in the J&K High Court by an unknown NGO, which was later probed for its sources of funding which were allegedly linked to a rogue unit in Military Intelligence.
Bikram Singh's detractors even made an issue of his Muslim daughter-in-law, by wrongly insinuating that she was a Pakistani.
Had Bikram Singh not made it as Army chief, the next-in-line to succeed V.K. Singh would have been Lt Gen K. T. Parnaik, whose retirement schedule would have put V.K. Singh kin, Lt Gen Ashok Singh as the frontrunner after him.
Bikram Singh survived the campaign against him, unprecedented in the Indian Army for its viciousness and communal colour. It was then that Lt Gen Dalbir Suhag came in the line of fire.
In March 2012, on the day the then Chinese President Hu Jintao was in New Delhi for the BRICS Summit, Gen V.K. Singh asked the CBI to probe Dalbir Suhag for alleged corruption in the procurement of parachutes during his tenure as Inspector General in the China-specific special force, the SFF. India has always denied to the Chinese the existence of this force, and ironically, the cover was blown off this secret force by V.K. Singh. This organisation was all over the headlines the day Hu Jintao was in town. The CBI threw out this complaint as frivolous.
V.K. Singh reserved his frontal assault on Dalbir Singh Suhag for the last week of his tenure. On the basis of a complaint of theft of a mobile during a low-level Military Intelligence raid on a suspected ULFA hideout led by a female captain in Jorhat in late 2011, V.K. Singh put Dalbir Singh on a promotion ban (Discipline & Vigilance ban) without first subjecting him to an inquiry. Dalbir, then commander of 3 Corps, was accused of (a) lapse of command. Despite approval by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet of his promotion to the rank of Army Commander, which would put him in the line of succession, he was rendered ineligible by this unexpected ban by V.K. Singh. This ban was revoked by General Bikram Singh soon after taking over as chief.
No prizes for guessing who the immediate beneficiary of the relegation of Dalbir Singh Suhag would have been: Lt Gen Ashok Singh.
An Army court of inquiry ultimately ended with indicting a havildar for stealing a mobile during the Jorhat raid, on the basis of which V.K. Singh wanted to unsettle the chain of succession to the post of Army chief.
Another interesting nugget on the V.K. Singh-Ashok Singh bonding was the troop movement to the outskirts of Delhi in January 2012 which "spooked" the UPA government and left it suspecting the intention of the Army chief at the height of his confrontation with the government over his age. A regiment of armoured vehicles from the Hisar-based 33 Armoured Division was moved to Delhi's periphery, causing much consternation and making the Defence Secretary summon the DG Military Operations to explain the movement. This unit was under 1 Corps, which was then commanded by Lt Gen Ashok Singh. V.K. Singh's headquarters dismissed this as a routine exercise. A bit curiously, neither the South-Western Army Commander (to which 1 Corps reports) nor the Western Army Commander (under whose command the Delhi Area falls) was aware of this movement when the matter was brought to their notice by intelligence agencies.
Gen V.K. Singh's renewed attack on Dalbir Singh comes in the final stages of the Defence Ministry processing the succession after Gen Bikram Singh. V.K. Singh has reiterated his severe reservations on Dalbir Singh, a soldier of humble origins, who is now being painted by some as a UPA general.
Why BJP will keep General VK Singh at arm’s length
Tuesday, 22 April 2014 - 12:54pm IST | Agency: DNA
Former Army Chief and now BJP candidate from Ghaziabad, General VK Singh, is no stranger to controversies. After wading through the long list of questions which were raised by both, the judiciary and media alike, Singh is back in the news, this time criticising the outgoing UPA government’s decision to appoint Admiral RK Dhowan as the new Navy Chief, and continuing the process of appointing Lt Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag as the new Chief of Army. 
In a recent article in The Sunday Guardian titled ‘VK Singh makes final bid to derail army succession’, journalist Vishal Thapar highlighted instances that showcase Singh as a person who managed to bring vengeful politics and communal opportunism within the top ranks of the Indian Army. Thapar portrays Singh as an uncharacteristic soldier, who looked to benefit familial ties within the army and went to what seem like great lengths to make his agendas successful. These lengths include the audacious report of an army troop movement near Delhi which “spooked” the government. 
After his retirement from the army, these very traits of General Singh were seen in the political sphere as he tried to make space for himself. First, he tried to make his space in the early parts of whatever it was that was brewing between Anna Hazare and Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress (TMC). In fact, General Singh even approached experts for help in order to create a proper strategy route-map for what he was hoping was going to be a new political front. However, as the Hazare-Banerjee ship sank, Gen Singh managed to make his way into the BJP instead. 
For the BJP, inducting Gen Singh was not a tough decision in view of their ticket distribution policy, which is based on a ‘whichever candidate can win’ point of view. Plus, the General’s Rajput background was ideal for the Ghaziabad seat, which was vacated by another BJP veteran who is a Rajput, and whose name is also now cropping up for the post of India’s next defence minister. Though doubts remain whether Gen Singh will actually win in Ghaziabad, a seat where the BSP is also expected to make an impact this time, the hope that his army background will attract votes has been seen as a clever move. Irrespective of his troublesome background in the ranks, electorally in a place like Ghaziabad, all such matters that made news in New Delhi would not have had a big impact at the polling booths. 
However, opinions suggesting that Gen Singh will be awarded with a plush post if Narendra Modi was to become the prime minister, such as defence as some passing remarks suggest, are far-fetched and devoid of logic. The reasons behind this are many, including the institutional practices of the BJP as a party itself.  
Gen Singh is a new entrant into the party, and this will drop his chances of being picked up for any major assignment in a new BJP-led government ahead of the party’s career politicians. Second, Narendra Modi, in his defence and foreign affairs bend, will look to have a bold and scientific policy, which is traditionally expected of a BJP-led government. Gen Singh’s hawkish personality will not be seen as an ideal fit. Third, his skewed service record and the general unease that his name creates within the bureaucracy, specifically in the Ministry of Defence and the Indian Army, will work heavily against him. Lastly, culturally speaking, major posts in a BJP government are given to well-tested candidates who also have the blessings of the RSS. 
Gen Singh is technically perfectly cut out for a life in politics. However, the fact that he first showcased these traits in a sacrosanct institution such as the Indian Army has created big stumbling blocks for him for a successful and far-reaching political career, at least in the immediate future. 
The BJP will hope for his win in Ghaziabad and that is the region where Gen Singh will be contained in as far as party work is concerned, although his expertise will come in use for the government in areas such as parliamentary committees and so on. If Narendra Modi does become the next occupant of 7 Race Course Road, he will be coming into power bearing the weight of huge expectations on his shoulders. The margin of error for Modi will be next to nil, and to protect himself, he will build his decision-making circle with faces he trusts without question. People, in the opposing political parties, the public and certain colleagues of his within the BJP, will be waiting for one misstep to seize an opportunity for themselves, and Modi will be made to work hard to avoid giving away any such opportunities.  
 Kabir Taneja, 28, is a Delhi-based journalist and scholar at The Takshashila Institution. He tweets at @KabirTaneja.



Saturday 26 April 2014

Could We Have Waited Before Implementing the AVSC/Bagga Commission Report






The Telegraph

Saturday, October 26, 2002

Army mulls VRS for senior officers

OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
New Delhi, Oct. 25: Army commanders’ meeting here this week have revived a proposal to create a new rank among its Generals and a formula for a voluntary retirement scheme for officers from Colonel upwards.
Last year, too, the army had sounded out the government on an internal committee (known as the Bagga Commission) recommendation to create the rank of Colonel-General, but the Ministry of Defence had practically shelved the idea.
A discussion on “greening” of the army, which is listed in the agenda for the bi-annual commanders’ conference, which concludes tomorrow.
The suggestion for a voluntary retirement scheme flows from a perceived need to allow superseded officers to opt out of service with a financial cushion.
Supercession usually begins from the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel upwards. The army has been pointing out that promotions are tardier in comparison with the civil and the police services.
If the proposal for a voluntary retirement scheme is accepted, an estimated 2,000 senior officers would have the option of leaving the service with “golden handshakes” of Rs 10 to Rs 20 lakh.
The retirement scheme will also pave the way for younger officers to pick up senior ranks.
The army top brass has also noted that though several of the officers are used for United Nations peacekeeping duties, they often do not enjoy the seniority their years of service merit, because many other armies have ranks — such as Colonel-General — that are deemed to be higher than Lieutenant-General.
The proposal to create the rank of “Colonel-General” — between the ranks of Lieutenant -General and General — is being reconsidered after it was first made by the Bagga Committee.
Lieutenant General H.S. Bagga retired as Director-General (Manpower planning and organisation) in the Army Headquarters.
During the commanders’ conference, as usual, the top brass has formed promotion boards for ranks from Brigadier upwards. There are more than 11,000 officer vacancies in the army.
Among the officer cadre of the army, there are presently an estimated 200 Major Generals and 60 Lt. Generals.
The Bagga Committee has proposed that the rank of Colonel-General be conferred on army commanders — general officers commanding the six army commands — and principal staff officers in the Army Headquarters — a total of about 24 posts.
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Outlook Magazine: 12 May 2008

Source: http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?237397

‘There's no officer shortage, just too many non-combat seniors’

With Caps On
  • Cadet intake into IMA and NDA is at an all-time high
  • Experts say shortage of 11,000 officers is of the army's own making
  • It has created a top-heavy structure with superseded and aging Lt colonels and colonels stagnating in peace stations
  • 3,000 officers are looking for premature retirement. The army has no exit policy.
  • The Air Force has 3,050 pilots when it only requires 1,700 of them.
  • Yet it claims a shortage of 1,528 officers.
*        *        *
Two weeks ago, Union defence minister A.K. Antony stood up in Parliament to answer once again a question that's been repeatedly raised for well over a decade now. Is the Indian army, navy and the air force short of officers? The answer has always been yes. Successive defence ministers have reiterated on the floor of the House that there is a serious shortfall in the forces.

But on April 16, Antony threw up a surprise. He told Parliament the Indian Military Academy (IMA), which trains officers for the Indian army, was actually running beyond its full capacity. While it can train 1,650 cadets, the IMA is currently training 1,683 cadets. Similarly, the National Defence Academy (NDA) "has also been functioning at full capacity except for the first batch of 2008,” said Antony. The subtext of his statement was that there are enough aspirants to join the forces. So if the training academies are running to full capacity, is the "officer shortfall" real?

Lt General H.S. Bagga, ex-director-general of personnel who spent eight years studying the problem and wrote the seminal Bagga Commission report, feels it "isn't real.” "Look at it this way," says Bagga. "Every year, I am taking in nearly 1,600 officers. Most of them are permanent commission officers while some are short service. If I could reverse this and make the majority of them short service and a core group permanent, then my shortages disappear."

What he means is if there are fewer permanent commission officers who serve a minimum of 20 years, then the army would not be clogged with too many non-combat seniors—the operative phrase being 'non-combat'. This would also be better use of resources, facilitating more intake of younger officers for combat zones.

Most of the perceived shortage, says Bagga, is at the 'combat level', from lieutenants, majors and lieutenant colonels. "With a large number of officers stagnating at the higher ranks, my force is getting older and the young ones don't have avenues to grow. This is the problem. Give them an honourable exit policy after 8-10 years of service and you'll see this problem disappear." Bagga's study was amalgamated into the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee report that gave faster promotions to officers. But many feel had Bagga's original recommendations been implemented in toto, there would not have been this so-called shortage.

One aspect of being permanently commissioned is that an officer cannot quit even if he is superseded. Army HQ sources say there are nearly 3,000 officers at the levels of lieutenant colonels and colonels waiting to quit as they have been superseded. But the army is reluctant to release them. It's worried that a revamp of manpower policy would mean trimming its top-heavy hierarchy too.

Simply put, higher the officer strength, the more posts for brigadiers and generals. Currently, there are 75 major generals and 64 Lt Generals which, incidentally, is projected to go up to 204 and 84 respectively. This is very high for any army.

Defence analysts like K. Subrahmanyam have been calling for a smaller army with better teeth-to-tail ratio (more fighting men as compared to logistic support). Agrees former director general, military operations (DGMO), Lieutenant General V. Raghavan. He feels the army's lopsided manpower policies have created this "artificial" shortage. "Let's have a core group of permanent commissioned officers and a larger group of short service commission officers. These younger officers will lead the platoons, conduct operations, grow in service. And you can dilute the standards of intake for short service commission officers to improve intake. You don't have to train every one of them to become a field marshal!"


Raghavan also points out the danger of creating a situation similar to what happened after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 when a sudden influx of officers led to severe anomalies in subsequent years. "As these officers were promoted, we ended up having so many senior officers ready to command battalions, which simply weren't there."

The army says its 'operational' shortfall hovers around 11,000 (in an overall requirement of 46,616). This, say experts, is of its own making—a situation has been created where there is a glut at the Lt Colonel rank and above. At this level, if an officer does not get promoted, he stagnates for 12 years. He becomes ineligible to serve in a battalion and the army, facing a crunch where it matters, is stuck with redundancy higher up.

Bagga's report listed five exit policies. This, he says, would ensure that more men join the army, serve 10 years and leave, while a core group continues to grow to occupy the senior ranks. Points out Bagga: "I listed out five exit slabs — (1) study leave without any clause to serve further, (2) an opportunity to take up a university course at the army's cost; (3) a golden handshake or (4) allowing them to appear for any civil service exam in their 13th year of service; or (5) tie up with corporates to absorb those superseded."

Like the army, the IAF too claims it has a shortage of 1,528 officers. Asks former air chief S. Krishnaswamy: "Where is the shortage if your squadron strength is steadily falling and your number of pilots are going up?" A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation by him shows "one of the worst pilot-to-cockpit ratios in the world.” Air Force documents say the number of fighter squadrons comprising 14 aircraft each will go down from the present 30 to 28 by 2015. Points out Krishnaswamy: "The best thing to do is to let people go after 10 years of service. It's the only way we can make things work. By holding back officers forcibly we are creating an artificial shortage at the cost of operational preparedness."

The air force has a pilot strength of 3,050 pilots. This is way above the 1,700 pilots the force requires. "We need to seriously consider options to run our forces in the most economical manner. Otherwise, subsequent budgets will not be able to support our manpower," says Krishnaswamy. Presently, pilots are being sent on deputation to fly state government aircraft. Jammu & Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu are among the states which are served by IAF pilots.

The world over, modern militaries are going in for a leaner and meaner force. But the Indian army is still dependent on conservative World War II templates, especially when it comes to manpower recruitment and deployment. With a fat midriff and a heavy top, the army and the air force has flab which it owes to itself to get rid off immediately.

*        *        *        *        *


Measures To Attract And Retain Talent In The Indian Army

Source: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=175&u_id=5

Dy Director, CLAWS
E-Mail-tuteja.ravi@rediffmail.com

25 AUG 2008 - SEMINAR REPORT
General
The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a one day seminar on “Measures to Attract and Retain Talent in the Indian Army” on Monday, 25 Aug 2008 at CLAWS seminar hall. The Keynote Address was delivered by Lt Gen Thomas Mathew, PVSM, AVSM, Adjutant General. The seminar was attended by a large number of serving officers and members of the strategic community.
The seminar was chaired by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd). The panelists included Lt Gen KR Rao, AVSM, VSM, DG MP & PS, Lt Gen HS Bagga, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) and Maj Gen Surjit Singh, AVSM, VSM (Retd).

Keynote Address
While delivering the Keynote Address, the AG said that it is now realised by the government that addressing deficiencies in the army is not a problem only of the Army but it is now a national problem and needs to be addressed at the highest level. A large number of studies have been undertaken in the past to find a solution to this national problem. There has been some degree if success in the implementation of these studies. Yet there has been a steady decline in the intake and deficiencies have continued to rise since 2004. This can be attributed to the opening up of the economy and the resultant lucrative job market for young people in the corporate world. He said that, Army Headquarters has formulated a three-pronged strategy to address the deficiencies of officers in the lower ranks. This three-pronged approach consists mainly of in-house measures so that the service becomes more attractive. The salient points are:
  • Have a small core of permanent commissioned officers while having a large support base of short service commissioned officers or SSCOs. The SSCOs will be given an easy exit policy with the option of two years study leave at government expense. They will also be given assured admission to a post graduate college on release and also made members of the Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS).
  • Make in service intakes such as Special Commission Officers (SCOs) and Special List Officers (PC SL), more attractive by refining the schemes and also provide promotions up to the rank of Col for SCOs and Maj Gen for PC SL officers. 
  • Improve the 10+2 Entry Scheme by carrying out SSB for students while they are still in class XI, and their medical when they are in class XII. Thereafter their  graduation will be sponsored by the government and they will join as short service  commissioned officers both for the technical and non-technical streams. He added that while there would be non-UPSC entrance exam for technical streams, a UPSC entrance exam would still be held for non-technical streams. 
At the end of the address, the AG said that while the above measures are under active consideration of the Ministry of Defence, he would welcome suggestions for further measures that need to be taken to improve the large deficiencies in the officer cadre of the Indian Army. 
Panel Discussion
Lt Gen KR Rao, AVSM, VSM, DG MP & PS:-  While giving his presentation, the DG MP & PS brought out that despite savvy marketing strategies, the best MNCs today are facing challenges in attracting and retaining top quality talent. In fact, every Army in the world today is facing a talent crunch and wars in Iraq, Afghanistan have stretched the US, UK and EU armies to breaking point. To enlist one soldier, the US is contacting 120 young people today. He also highlighted the evolution of the officer cadre in the Indian Army from the Kings Commission in 1918 to the establishment of the Indian Military Academy in 1932 with 470 Indian officers passing out of IMA in 1939 as against 4000 British officers. Ever since then, the cadre strength has gone up. But the officer cadre has been deficient ever since independence as the size of the Indian Army has grown exponentially. He also highlighted the reasons for continued deficiency even despite large scale public relations campaigns as under:
 The career in the Army has become increasingly unpopular due to the fact that:
  •   The status of Army officers has steadily declined over the years.
  •   The Army Officers poor career progression opportunities, which are coupled with early retirement age.
  •   Frequent postings, low emoluments, attractiveness of the corporate world and an unsettled life coupled with higher risks make the service more   unpopular.
  •  An archaic exit policy that gives a feeling akin to being bonded labour has become a barrier for fresh entries.
  •  SSCO entry continues to be unattractive as there are no incentives for those leaving after completion of their short service commissions.
  •  Exponential increase in force levels that has been coupled with large number of officers seeking pre-mature retirement.
The deficiency in the officer cadre has led to ills such as lower morale and motivation, more burden on JCOs and NCOs who are not trained to lead and hence a decline in the officer-soldier ratio. This has resulted in lower organisational efficiency. 
 The DG MP & PS also recommended a three-pronged national approach that needs to undertaken to address the officer deficiency by 2020.  The three prongs which have been identified are:
  •  Better pay and perks.
  •  Improve intake into training institutions.
  •  Carry out in-house measures to make service in the army more attractive by reviewing policies and refining incentives. 
He brought out a futuristic cadre profile of intake where efforts would be made to popularise both regular intake and improve SSCO, SCO and PC (SL) entries in the Army. He said that while the intake to NDA would remain the same, it is proposed to reduce the intake of direct entries; ACC and UES from 640 to 110 a year. At the same time it is proposed to increase all SSCO, SCO, PC (SL) entries from the present 850 per year to 1600 per year. He further added that since the 10 + 2 Technical Entry Scheme has so far been the most popular hence it is proposed to increase the intake from this entry from 170 a year to 350 a year.
He also added that to make the Short Service Commissioned Officer (SSCO) entry more popular there is a proposal to implement the following:
  •  Lumpsum grant of Rs 10/14 lacs on release.
  •  Two years professional enhancement leave after eight years of service.
  •  Concessions for appearing in Civil Services entrance exams.
  •  Lateral absorption in PSUs/CPMFs/CPOs.
All the above proposals have been recommended by the AV Singh Committee as well. DGMP & PS gave further details of the methodology and refinements that will be carried out once the proposals are agreed to by the Ministry of Defence.
Lt Gen HS Bagga: -      During his presentation Lt Gen HS Bagga stressed that a career in the Army should not be taken as the sole career of one’s life. An army officer should be allowed to use this career as a stepping stone to move on to civilian life after having acquired the requisite skills to opt for a second career. He further added that the steepness of the pyramid for higher promotions has had a crippling effect on the attractiveness of the Army. He drew a comparison between Indian Army and Indian Police Service regarding cadre improvement from 1973 onwards. He said that while in 1973 the IPS had only one IGP in a state, who was equivalent to a Maj Gen, by 1996 all states had a DGP equivalent to an Army Commander and an additional DGP who is equivalent to a Lt Gen and the number of IGPs
is now very high. He also brought out the disparity with civil services where only 0.43% officers make it to Maj Gen in the army and 21.4% make it to joint secretary in the civil services. He highlighted the major recommendations of the AV Singh committee report:
  •  Early promotion of battalion and brigade commanders to maintain a young profile in command.
  •  Time based promotion to rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
  •  Time scale Colonel at 26 years of service.
  •  Minimum of Brigadier’s pay to all officers in the last year of service.
  •  Creation of an additional rank of Colonel General.
  •  In service training of officers for second career.
  •  VRS to officers overlooked for promotion.
  •  Increase In select rank vacancies as under :
        Additional Vacancies 
  •  Colonel General         88
  •  Lieutenant General    20
  •  Major General           75
  •  Brigadier                  222
  •  Colonel                  1484
But so far only time scale promotions up to the rank of Lt Col and 750 additional vacancies for Colonels have been implemented.
He summarised additional recommendations that need to be implemented:
  • There is a need for generating awareness programmes indicating the Army’s strength at a national level.
  • There should be a campaign for image building through National Cadet Corps, Branch Recruiting Organisations and media.
  • Intake in Sainik Schools/Military Schools should be improved.
  • States should be encouraged to run schools for preparing young people for Armed Forces.
  • Advertisements for the Armed Forces should show the “cost to company” and not merely the salary and allowances.
  • The Ministry of Defence must establish a separate cell to manage manpower related issues.
  • At the national level, the Army should be considered as a special service which is controlled by the MoD and not by the Department of Personnel and training (DoPT).
  • Salaries and allowances of Armed Forces should not be governed by a pay commission but by a permanent Pay Review Body that is established only for the armed forces.

Maj Gen Surjit Singh: - Having been associated with the 4th and 5th Central Pay Commissions (CPC), Maj Gen Surjit Singh said that even after a review of the 6th CPC recommendations there are several anomalies. He highlighted that all scales have been created for civil services and the military has been inserted in as a ‘force fit’. The creation of the Pay Band 3 and Pay Band 4 is an apparent ploy to divide the officer cadre into two classes. The other anomalies that were brought out are:
Stipend for officer cadets has not been given while civil service probationers are paid from the day their training starts. Even their seniority for service commences on the same day whereas for officers it starts on the day of commission which is four years after a cadet joins NDA.
The officer cadre should be in the highest pay band and not two distinct categories. However, the civil servants have been able to convince the government that if a Brigadier gets more pay than a joint secy (if number of years of service is taken as a criterion of pay) then civil control over the military will be diluted.

Army Commander’s salary has been pegged below that of a Director General of Police for the first time.
He brought out that since only 40% of the arrears are to be admitted in this financial year, detailed instructions should only be issued when all outstanding issues have been fully resolved. If anomalies can be resolved at a later stage, then anomalies can also be forestalled. A good pay structure should aim at equity and should not be one that leads to a sense of bitterness or a feeling of inequity.
He also laid stress on some non-pecuniary irritants that are detrimental to firstly attracting and then retaining talent in the Army. These are:-
 
  • A benign fear of getting superseded at each rank after the rank of Colonel.
  • Retirement ages being early an officer retires at a time when his children are either at a marriageable age or pursuing higher studies.
  • Resettlement avenues are limited and hence detrimental to young blood joining the Army.
  • Turbulence and separation from family is a common feature.
  • The service routine is repetitive and hence lacks growth. This is further stunted by mediocre leadership that snubs initiative.
  • To make matters worse, premature retirement applications are rejected on petty grounds amounting to ‘reverse conscription’, making the military a veritable mouse trap.
He made the following recommendations:-
  • Every officer must be imparted at least one skill or specialisation at service expense.
  • Industry should be motivated to employ Army officers.
  • Lateral movement of officers to Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs)/Central Police Organisations (CPOs)/Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) must be implemented as recommended by the 6th CPC.
  • One rank one pension which is a long standing anomaly must be resolved at the earliest.

Discussion
The following aspects emerged during the discussion:
  • Most politicians and bureaucrats in other countries undergo basic military training before they get into government. Even is India there should a provision for all IAS officers and those of attired central services to undergo training at NDA/IMA and serve an attachment of about five years in army units. This would give them a better understanding of what the Army is all about when they are in various ministries and at decision making levels.
  • Even if there is disparity in rank structure of the military and civil servants there should be parity of salaries at par with the number of years of service.
  • The proposal of carrying out SSB for students of class XI and medical in class XII for those who are selected coupled with a stipend for the entire duration of the students graduation will not be successful. This is due to the fact that there will be a big gap between the selection and joining and a number of students will fall prey to the lure of the corporate world in this duration.
  • The biggest advertisers for attracting talent in the Army are those who are already in service. Yet the percentage of sons of Army officers joining the Army is abysmal. There is a need for introspection with regard to this.
  • A number of self-imposed restrictions such as signing of five year bonds after long courses/UN assignments and three year residual service after study leave must be done away with. In any case it is seldom that officers ever get to do assignments post study leave commensurate with their specialisation.
Conclusion  
The discussion and presentations were well received by all present. The seminar raised a number of positive suggestions that can be implemented to attract and retain talent in the Army.
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