George Bernard Shaw is quoted to
have said, “Take care to get what you like or you will be forced to like what
you get.”
* * * * *
Let me start by assuring readers
of this post that I am a Confirmed Chronic Cynic. Readers,
intelligent ones at that, know that a cynic is one who knows the cost of
everything (well, almost) but the value of nothing. So, please let this scroll
across your mind as you read and you might be objective in your criticism and
suggestions (which are the aims of this piece) …….
My impression, after a chat with Comdt CDM a few weeks ago, was that the
seminar of 05 Mar 14 was more by way of stimulating an intelligent debate,
learning first hand the benefits and pitfalls of past presentations to Pay Commissions,
recording them for posterity, and by being less dogmatic about who lost and by
how much.
Separately, I was also told by “sources” that a prominent member of
the 6th CPC is still upset by the tone & tenor of Armed Forces
presentations/presenters and, therefore, did not wish to attend the seminar.
The loss is of the audience and the Armed Forces, for we might have gained a
better insight from the “man in the ring.”
Now that 7 CPC has sent an
epistle and a questionnaire “seeking the considered views
of all stakeholders is enclosed. The response of your Ministry to this
Questionnaire is sought. I shall be grateful if the replies are furnished to
the Commission on or before 10th May, 2014, so as to enable the Commission to
take them into account as part of its examination of the issues that it is
mandated to address. The reply may be sent to Post Box No. 4599, Hauz Khas P.O,
New Delhi 110 016, and in the case of email to secy-7cpc@nic.in.”
The Bureaucracy
We, Armed Forces personnel too
often, if not always, compare/base our “profit and loss” statements post every
CPC vis-à-vis mainly the IAS, which is “the bureaucracy” to most of us. David
Gilmour wrote in his book titled ‘The Ruling Caste’ that the bureaucracy is “more
obsessed with status and promotion,” though it may be of little consolation to
the “status first” promoters of the Armed Forces.
Any affirmation, if two more were
needed, of the bureaucracy destroying the myth of their efficiency and
self-sacrificial esprit-de-corps are (1) the number of retired Secretaries
selected on extended tenures as Advisers to PM, FM etc (and none, thank God, so
far, to the RM) and (2) the selective implementation of the Non-Functional
Upgradation – upgraded with cash payout the because some one else, more
deserving perhaps, in the same batch had been promoted two years earlier and started
to earn more. There is always the self-righteous justification that everyone
who has to be given NFU has to meet some stringent (?) criteria but who decides
whether they really do? That there isn’t a single protest that I have read of,
on the World Wide Web, is proof of the pudding of my statement!
But with a higher percentage,
compared to the Armed Forces, rising to the level of Addl Secy, what was the
need for NFU? Was it to offset the MSP? Something like NFU as financial
comfort and consolation for inability to match some one else’s merit; MSP for
risking one’s own life (and being kicked around too) and not because someone
else has risked/is risking his/her life to defend the Nation’s sovereignty and
integrity!
Many CPCs’ include a statement in
their preamble that an edge must be maintained for the IAS, because it has
always been so (the “precedent syndrome”?) Is it, “the problem was that ICS
officers were expected to be experts in everything but were trained to be
experts in nothing” (ibid, page 113).
Is it any different today? Just
three examples –
Read the file
notings of DS (E.III.A, MoF/DoE) and his interpretive query about confining the
benefits of the Apex Court’s order in IA No. 9 of 2010 to similarly situated
officers of the Army because in his reading “only Army officers appear to be
the litigants.” How is it he, the expert, not comprehend that Rank Pay was a
matter that affected officers of all three Services? Even
Lord Curzon, if he were to be resurrected would be “astonished by a system in
which proposals circulated the departments and returned to their starting point
many months later, garnished with an array of minutes from Secretaries and
under-secretaries who revelled in dialectics and had perfected the art of ‘the
put down” (ibid page 214).
Retired
Secretaries (Sarvashri Rangarajan, Shome etc) are appointed as Advisers to the
Govt. Does that mean that the IAS incumbents headed by the Cabinet Secretary, tacitly
acknowledge that there is comparative lack of intellectual capacity and
expertise in the incumbents that compels the Govt to recall retired IAS
officers? Why isn’t the IAS association protesting the employment of these
Advisers, like it did when IAS officers of Andhra Pradesh were called in for
questioning by CBI in the Jaganmohan Reddy case?
Retired DsGP
have been appointed advisers (like for anti-naxal role in Jharkhand) but what
about the resultant question mark on competency/capability on the incumbent DGP
and his officers?
Is the bureaucracy, to quote
Gilmour, “reconciled to a dominant race which holds all high offices in its
hands and treats others with patronising kindness, professing to teach them
everything,” (ibid page 17)? Or may be the bureaucracy has taken, very seriously,
the words of Lord Mayo “that we are all (British) gentlemen engaged in the
magnificent work of governing an inferior race,” (ibid, page 19) and are trying
to teach the lesser children of the bureaucratic God something!
It is blindingly obvious that “usurpation
of authority without concomitant acceptance of responsibility” is the motto of
the bureaucracy for “they might have had the ‘paper knowledge’ of a particular
subject but seldom had the practical experience” (ibid, page 215).
On the other hand, even after the
only debacle faced by the Armed Forces (in 1962), how many former Chiefs of the
Armed Forces have been appointed advisers to the RM? Or are the incumbents
worthy of their appointments (though there is a different school of thought
that always sees the dark cloud and not the silver lining!)
The Mission of Armed Forces
The primary mission of the Armed
Forces, which comprises Officers and Other Ranks (since there are severe
objections to the term PBOR), is that the Indian Armed Forces is to ensure
national security and unity,
defending the nation from external aggression
and threats, and maintaining peace and security within its borders. They
conduct humanitarian rescue operations during natural calamities and other
disturbances, and can also be requisitioned by the government to cope with
internal threats.
But does that give us the right
or self-righteous not to look at ourselves first, having sacrificed lives,
limbs, blood, sweat, and tears?
Status or Parity?
Now let us turn to the lament
that the IAS is eroding the status of, and parity with, the Armed Forces and we
are ready to cut off our noses (remove ranks of Lt Col and Brig) to achieve
parity. Time has a harsh answer to this continuing bewailing of one’s fate. It
is called mockery.
Armed Forces leadership can
change this negative mind-set by being clear-headed and utilising the distinct
and nationally well-respected ethos, comparative integrity and honesty, to
place genuine requirements before the Government or the 7 CPC. Veterans may
have many suggestions but the genuine ones need to be separated from the
self-serving.
Indian Armed Forces have won all
wars (and lost one thanks to we know who), it is because of our strength of
character, bravery, and initiative. Let us not dishonour the Victoria Cross,
George Cross, PVC, MVC, VrC and other gallantry award winners by stopping
pitying ourselves. If Armed Forces hierarchy stands up for the legitimate,
environment dictated rights and remunerations, nobody can deny them unless they
wish to place themselves at risk.
Even acidic op editorials by a
Chief Editor whose major contribution to the Armed Forces, by his own
admission, is building a war memorial in Chandigarh, did not stop the three
Chiefs from stand up for justice just about half a decade ago. Making one’s
emotion laden views heard, or read or talked about is one thing; proposing
sensible solutions is altogether in a higher (and rational) plane.
Promotions, Steep Pyramidal
Structure and other things
Having had the benefit of reading
many disgruntled opinions and views, on many blogs and the ubiquitous Chatroll,
against those who were promoted (a minority) by those who were not (the
majority), I draw attention to Gilmour again about the age-old malady, “Promotions
inevitably caused bitterness amongst people who did not get what they felt they
deserved. There were charges of favouritism and vindictiveness against senior
officers on account of their selection,” (ibid page 219). Many of those
affected appear not to realise that post-1962 mass inductions were “a decision
that eased the immediate…problem but quickly led to a promotion block for those
recruited subsequently” (ibid, page 221).
And, as for those with the
recurring chorus "No one can help the Armed Forces, if we were/are like
this," let up stop bemoaning our (sad?) fate and do something fast,
strong, and positive. Exaggerated self-pity becomes a façade for personal
advancement. Many of us have steadily declined to become humbugs and
hypocrites. Some of us have proceeded to the next stage of self-legitimising
and become those who will brook no resistance to the self-promotion of our own sense
of injustice.
Look at the upper echelons of the
Army’s officer cadre [Source: CDM - De-linking of Pay Scales from Ranks]:
Lt Gens – 90; Maj Gens 295 (or about 32%
promoted to Lt Gen); Brig – 1117 (or 37% promoted to Maj Gen); Cols 4762 (or 23%
promoted to Brig); Lt Col 9996 (or approximately 50% promoted to Col). The
ratio in the Navy and Air Force is hardly different. The promotion policy in
the Armed Forces, including for the COAS or equivalent requires three names to
be put up (or 33% chances of promotion).
There are only 43 lieutenant
generals on active duty in the U.S. Army (strength about 11 lakhs). Fewer
than one-half percent (<0.5%) of commissioned officers make it to the top
three ranks (source:
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/army/a/armyltgen.htm.)
Compare with the table provided
for the IPS [Source: CDM - De-linking of Pay Scales from Ranks]: DGP – 54; ADGP – 202 (or 25% promoted to DGP);
IG – 499 (or 50% promoted to ADGP); DIG – 496 (or 99.9% promoted to IG); and SP
– 1328 (or 25% promoted to DIG).
Is there a suggestion that there
should be more in the ranks of Brig/Maj Gen and Lt Gen (and equivalents)? Making
for fatter (no allusion to the girth lines), softer (ditto) and, older (with
related ailments) Armed Forces to get rid of the ‘pyramidal’ problem?
In a recent meeting called by a
Veteran for ‘strategising’ about what we should place before the PARC (to my
cynical mind, an unlikely event), I was aghast to hear a just retired two star officer
bemoan that he had 16 superseded officers in his Sub-area HQ, who clocked in
their attendance and took off for the golf course. I asked the General why he
did not use his Command & Control to discipline those 16. I was told, “Sir,
you know how it is. They don’t listen!” I told him that when I was promoted to
take over as CO of Air HQ Comn Sqn, there were 17 officers who were senior to
me, including the senior-most who was 10 courses my senior. They knew their
responsibilities and accountability and I knew mine. And we flew VVIPs and VIPs
all over the country with none of the seniors pushing off to play golf after
reporting for work!
What, if some one can enlighten
my feeble mind, is the solution to the ‘steep pyramid’ problem? I may be
looking in the wrong places, because I have yet to come across a solution to
the steep pyramid that will not dilute the responsibilities or cause more of
the abstract ‘command & control’ problems. Elsewhere I have posted the
Bagga Commission/AVSC recommendations and debate, which spurs the comment of an
anonymous US official, “We just have to keep doing what we are doing and hope
it takes us somewhere.” But what if it leads to a place that no one wants to
go? Could the Services, in 20:20 hindsight have had the wisdom of the Navy in
not implementing the recommendations?
Or would votaries of the “get rid
of the steep pyramidal problem” suggest that Lt Gens, Maj Gens and Brigs
execute the charter of duties one rank lower (and dent the WoP some more?); Or
maybe, as in utopia, bring down the retirement ages by 2 years for a third of
the Lt Gens, Maj Gens and Brigs so younger officers will replace them?
While we are fixated with
officers, let us not forget the Other Ranks. To start with, take a look at
their terms of service, their service conditions, their promotion prospects,
ACP notwithstanding. When was the last cadre review done? 2009! Five years ago?
The status of JCOs, NCOs, and soldiers
has declined. Assistants in AFHQ services are placed in the grade pay of Rs
4600, which is equal to a Subedar, whereas till 6th pay commission, their pay
scales were below that of a Nb Sub. It is a known but discreetly neglected fact
that all JCOs in Indian army are group B gazetted officers, and by placing an
Asst, which is a non-gazetted civilian post above that of a JCO in Indian Army,
we are seeing the first stage of the erosion of the Other Ranks.
Why do the Other Ranks have three
Groups and different pay scales between X Group
Rs 1400 extra) and Y & Z Groups? Officers of the Arms and Services have
the same pay scales, except for AMC, ADC, and RVC? One may trot out that the entry
qualifications are different for different groups but then aren’t there
Engineers and post-graduates (in Meteorology etc) in the Officer Corps who do
not have separate pay scales?
Finally & In Conclusion
OK, I am ready with the Kevlar
body suit and armour! My brains, and other organs or what is left of them, have
been promised to the nearest CH!!
E & O E
At the risk of being shot at (and
not having a 56” chest!), here are my opinions/suggestions/recommendations for
those intelligent minds in the Veterans community.
I - Warrant of Precedence
(WoP), Status and all that
I regret (or should I be proud?)
to admit that the cynicism (and its corollary ‘name dropping’) is due to
seeing, meeting, and flying Presidents, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, and
Defence Ministers etc for well over a decade. So I should have recused myself
from expressing an opinion but a cynic is one who knows the cost of……
Personally, I feel that "WoP” or “status" is an issue of who sits
closest to the Supreme Commander on 26 Jan and 29 Jan and (is in the frame
before the contingent commander shouts “saamne dekh") or to the PM at the Red
Fort on 15 Aug.
In the WoP 1937 for India there
was just the Viceroy and then the members of his Council. There was a different
WoP in the UK, where the Viceroy was not No.1. Therefore, bemoaning “Dropping
down the WoP” does not appear to have taken into consideration that No. 2, 3
and 4 are Vice President, PM and Deputy PM/Foreign head of Government followed
by the Governors, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers of the states, Lt Governors,
Ministers of State with independent charge, and Ministers of State etc (not
necessarily in that order) before the Chiefs figure.
II - Steep Pyramidal Structure
Unlike the civil services, where
medical fitness is not mandatory either for carrying out duties nor age-related slowing of the body (and
mind) a constraint, the Armed Forces need to place medical fitness as close as
possible to rational thinking, initiative and innovativeness.
So what do the Armed Forces do
with those with the slowing body and increasing ailments except to retire
personnel at lower ages though they are, by civilian standards of work,
adequately fit?
Will flattening the pyramid (or
flat organisation, as I hear it is called) help? If so, how? Today, having implemented
the Bagga Committee recommendations and subsequent AVSC implementation, are the
Armed Forces better off? Leaner, meaner, younger?
To me, a chronic cynic, it
appears that ranks in the Army and Air Force have been diluted with adverse
consequences because of below-par number of inductions. Soon the pyramid will
flatten itself into a sheet because more officers, and their uncles, standard
of performance notwithstanding, will have to be promoted to fill in those
Bagga/AVSC vacancies! The day isn’t far off when top Armed Forces officers take
to the AFT or Courts to be appointed Army Cdr equivalents and Chiefs just like
DGPs are doing in many states!
While fixated with the Officers
cadre, are we forgetting that the other ranks did not benefit from any Bagga
Committee or AVSC? That many PBOR (in the Air Force, at least) now take between
20 and 24 years to achieve a Warrant rank (equivalent of a Nb Sub) in many
non-technical trades? Don’t they have a pyramidal structure that needs some
attention (and drastic surgery?)
Amalgamate the different groups
in the Other Ranks into one with a common basic compensation package. Add
allowances for qualifications required for different technical qualifications
or higher educational qualifications (i.e, JCOs in the Army Education Corps
etc).
What the Armed Forces direly need
is a cadre review by a professional “no-stakes” organisation to decide on what
should be the optimal command and control structure and commensurate manpower.
For that, there are two pre-requisites – The Government spelling out the
National Aim and consequently the Ministry of Defence clearly enunciating the
Military aim. A speaker at the recent CDM seminar bemoaned that fact that we
have neither! The RM’s Op Directive is not enough.
III - Separation of Command & Control aspects from Personal
Remuneration
Keep ranks for command and control requirements only; same as the bureaucracy has
its hierarchy of US, DS, Director, DG (if required), JS, Addl Secy, Spl Secy,
and Secy.
If the intention is to have lean,
mean, and young Armed Forces, then first make an objective assessment of how
the military aim would be met and how much manpower would be required. Review
the charter of duties of all designations from Army Cdr & PSO downwards to
give respect to the rank of the officer. Remember, by eliminating ranks like Lt
Col and Brig because there is no parity, one only tends to devalue/dilute the
ranks of Col and Maj Gen. I know from personal example. As a newly commissioned
officer, I was detailed for Orderly Officer duties which were earlier carried
out by the Warrant Ranks. Later on Sqn Ldr carried out Base ops duties,
assigned earlier to Fg Offrs and Flt Lts.
IV – Pay, Allowances, and
Perquisites (Personal Remuneration Package)
Delink rank from Personal
Remuneration Package.
Separate
remuneration scales or pay bands from ranks and link it to years of service.
For the same numbers years of
service an Armed Forces officer would get the same pay and allowances and
perquisites as IAS/IPS/Gp 'A' officer.
For the same numbers years of
service an Armed Forces Other Ranks would get the same pay and allowances and
perquisites as Gp 'B' civilians.
Calculate
the new CPC pay by the following formula: -
Basic
Pay as on 31 Dec 2015 x cost inflation index (CII) of 2015 divided by cost inflation
index of 2006 (year of CPC)
i.e Rs 40000 x CII of 2015 say 1110 = Rs
44400000 divided by 519 = Rs 85540.13 rounded off to next 10 rupees i.e Rs
85550
Grade
Pay and MRP (Military Risk Pay) be increased in the above manner.
MoF
may consider announcing the CII on 01 Apr of each year so that increments could
be linked to the CII and paid in the financial year, facilitating better income
tax collection.
Note: Please see added element of Performance Incentive for Select List promotees from Col and
above as differentiator below.
V – Pension
Pension norms for Armed Forces
officers will be the same as for IAS/IPS/Gp ‘A’ Services.
Pension norms for Other Ranks
will be the same as for civilian Gp ‘B’ services.
VI - Performance Incentive for
Select/Selection List Promotees
To ensure that ‘time scale’
increment does not detract from desired minimum performance, institute a
Performance Incentive (PI) of 15% of the Basic pay for officers placed in
Select(ion) List by Promotion Boards and promoted. Minimum performance required
to earn PI would be assessed for each Selection List promotion by Promotion
Boards. Payment of PI (at 15% of the Basic pay drawn) should be automatic from
the date of being found fit for those selected.
Anomalies in the PI scheme or any
allegations of wrong assessment could be appealed to and placed before the
Anomalies Resolution Committee comprising the COAS/ equivalent, one Army Cdr/equivalent,
and AG/PSO/equivalent for resolution.
VII - Anomalies Resolution
Board (ARB)
If a Committee of Secretaries
(CoS) can decide matters concerning the IAS/IPS/Gp ‘A’ services and alleviate
the resentment and inter-cadre grievances, why not Armed Forces officers in MoD
in decision making levels will mitigate the prevailing resentment that they are
ignored and discriminated against? If meaningful changes do not happen,
resentment builds up (as it has now) and the present adverse media reports are
proof enough. Inclusion of Armed Forces personnel at decision making levels of
the MoD is a matter of national self-interest as well as justice.
So, MoD, instead of referring each and every anomaly to the CoS, should constitute
an Anomalies Resolution Board, like the Railways Board, for conflict resolution.
ARB would comprise Defence Secretary as Chairperson, the three Vice Chiefs as
fulltime members, Secretary ESW, FA (DS), the Legal Adviser (Defence) and
DGAFMS (for disability benefit related appeals) as ex-officio members utilising
the CoSC secretariat for the paperwork.
ARB would meet once a month to
Consider
issues placed before it and review progress on past decisions. In any case all
issues should be resolved within three months from the date an issue has been
raised. For example, on the NFU, MoD replies to an RTI application that the
information cannot be disclosed under Section 8 of the RTI Act 2005 because the
matter is still under consideration and four years have lapsed!
Exchange
information/notes to improve the Civil-Military discourse.
The decision of the ARB can be
challenged only in a High Court or the Supreme Court.
VIII - Litigation & Costs
thereof
Many cases are being filed by the
MoD or Service HQ against decisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal, High Courts,
and Supreme Court. A directive (since withdrawn and awaiting disclosure from
DESW despite being paid additional charges of photocopying 3 months ago!) that
Service HQ must file appeals etc appeared to “save the Public Exchequer” by
keeping the Govt’s law officers “more” employed!
It must be made mandatory that,
for all cases to be filed against orders of AFT/High Courts/Supreme Court, a
legal certificate of fitness to file by at least the Legal Adviser (Defence) be
obtained and placed before the ARB for final decision.
Cost of filing cases
contradicting the advice of the LA (Def) or ARB and losing the cases must be
paid by the official who initiated the move to file the case despite advice to
the contrary. If a serving/Veteran petitioner/respondent pays costs for
frivolous litigation, why not the irresponsible Govt officer?
IX - Permanent Risk Related
Allowances/Pay
Risk related allowance pay for
Armed Forces would be for duties such as CI Ops, Flying risk, Submarine, High
Seas, and MARCOS etc. This would have exemption from income tax just as
insurance is tax-exempted etc. Increases may be proportional to the increase of
CII in base year (2015) to the current year
X - Temporary Risk Related
Allowances/Pay (TRAP)
Armed Forces units being tasked over
and above their peace time duties with CI Ops, Spl Ops, anti-piracy duties, posting
to high altitudes above 4000 metres AMSL, Aid to Civil power in Law & Order
situations, etc be paid TRAP for the duration the units/personnel are tasked on
these duties.
XI - Cost of Living
Compensation (CLC)
Instead of an annual increment,
all Armed Forces personnel as well as civilian employees and pensioners should be
paid a Cost of Living Compensation (CLC) equal to the increase in the cost
inflation index. The rate of inflation intimated by RBI would be the benchmark.
XII - Ordinary Pension
Ordinary pension be increased to
the following percentages of last pay drawn: -
Age of Pensioner
|
Percentage
|
Reasons/remarks
|
35-45
|
75%
|
(i) Non-fulfilment of Govt’s
assurance on lateral Absorption,
(ii) Continuing liabilities of
Children’s education, accn etc
|
45-55
|
60%
|
-”-
|
XIII - Family Pension
Family pension is reduced from
the prevailing 50% of last pay drawn of the pensioner on the mistaken belief
that death of the pensioner reduces the expenditure of the family by 20%.
In actual fact, the expenditure
increases because the family/widow has to pay the same local taxes and levies
as well as pay for services of a driver (at Rs 300 for 4 hours being the
minimum), handy-man etc, for chores that the pensioner performed before death.
Further, the pension of a
pensioner is not reduced by 20% when his/her spouse passes away. Therefore,
family pension be paid at rates indicated above.
XIV - Disability Pension
Broad banding of disability
benefits is implemented.
Appeal against decisions of Disability
Medical Boards may be arbitrated by/appealed to ARB for resolution.
XV - Transfer Benefits
Personnel may be allowed one
month’s remuneration as disturbance pay in addition to payment of actual costs
of the transportation of household effects, including pets and vehicles.
Production of bills be made mandatory (and in contradiction to what CDM
proposes).
XVI - Leave Travel Benefits
(LTB)
All personnel and families may be
permitted LTB three times a year to their recorded place of permanent residence
or a place at a lesser distance. The cost may be compensated on production of
air/rail tickets. Air travel may be permitted by any airline subject to the
fare not exceeding the fare(s) levied by Air India.
XVII – Institutionalised system of lateral
Absorption
Institutionalise
a system of lateral absorption across all levels. If a Lt Gen can be appointed
to AFTs or head some study cell, or for that matter ex- bureaucrats and Chiefs
go as Governors/Lt Governors/Ambassadors/High Commissioners/Advisers to
Ministries (which anyway have a plethora of Secretary level officers) , why
cannot a jawan or JCO or Officer be absorbed in a Govt or PSU job?
XVIII - Re-employment in
Government jobs
The Govt of India (GoI)
assured the Armed Forces, in its approval of the recommendations of the 6th
CPC, of lateral absorption of able personnel. The GoI reneged on its assurance
stating that the Home Ministry has objections as if the Ministry is a different
entity from the GoI. Those who opted for lateral absorption but did not get it
due to such appalling decisions should be paid the last pay drawn as pension
till the age of superannuation of the post for which he/she was eligible.
There should be no
reduction in pension of Armed Forces Veterans on re-employment in govt jobs
similar to other Central Government All India Services like the IAS not having
this.
XIX - Reduction of Wastage of Public Expenditure
Often payment of legitimate dues,
even after clear orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in favour of Armed Forces
appellants, serving or Veterans, are challenged/appealed against by MoD, citing
the cost to the State Exchequer.
Do
other large central organizations like Railways have such a dual monstrosity
placed over them to carry out accounts and audit? Finance Commissioner is a
member of the Railway Board but is under the Ministry of Finance and the
Railway Board is directly responsible to the Railways Minister.
If
Air Force and Navy can function on their own why can not the same structure be
implemented in Army with prorated additional manpower?
There
is one aspect that we some how need to highlight and that is the proliferation
of a monster called the Defence Accounts Department, which started with a few
CDAs to a humungous organization is now so full of PCsDA and CsDA. In late
1960s and early 1970s (when the Armed Forces were full strength) with CGDA as
the head, following was the set up:
- Army
- CDA (O)
- CDA (Pensions)
- CDA (Western Command) at Meerut which shifted
to Chandimandir sometime in late 90s
- CDA (Central command that Included Eastern
Command) – later bifurcated
- JCDA (Funds)
- CDA (OR) which had under it PAOs (DCDA/ACDA
Level) at training centres
- Local Audit of units was done by LAOs who
reported to CDA Commands
- DCDA (Air Force)
- CDA (Navy)
Let me illustrate with just one
example.
Information (about 1000 pages)
provided under the RTI Act 2005 by MoD, MoF/DoE and CGDA in just the Rank pay
cases (Maj A K Dhanapalan Vs. UoI and later in UoI vs. Lt Col N K Nair &
others) revealed that the laying down of an accounts policy and audit system of
the Armed Forces is done by the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA),
after a polite demur to its Competent Authority – the Financial Adviser
(Defence Services) who sits in South Block, next to the MoD.
This Secretary,
Defence/Finance–cum-Financial Adviser, Defence Services (FADS) in MoD is
supposedly the “boss” of the CGDA. Under this Secretary-cum FADS there are
several Addl FADS and hierarchy, whose role appears to be just acting as a
liaison office between MoD, MoF/DoE, and CGDA.
In the Rank Pay matter, the CGDA
operated as the policy maker as well as audit authority, as inferred by the photocopies
of notings on files. Preparation of the DGL and norms for implementation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders in the Rank Pay case, as disclosed by CGDA in
255 pages of information, was dictated by CGDA and ‘rubber stamped’ by the
Secy, Def/Fin or FADS. Not the other way around!
Every subsequent appeal/challenge
to the Rank Pay cases filed by respondents/petitioners against UoI, and
photocopies of notings thereof, contains nothing on policy or procedures by
FADS but are replete with voluminous arguments by CGDA and supported by MoF/DoE,
with just a minute/signature of the FADS or a JS/Addl DS.
The MoF/DoE even castigated the
MoD (and obviously FADS) in its note dated 05 July 13 for not even preparing a
draft reference of the matter to the Ld Attorney General for his opinion but
forwarding the reference dated March 13 by the CGDA without a comment.
It is therefore recommended that either
the post of Secy Def/Fin-FADS and the attached paraphernalia or the CGDA
be abolished to save the Public Exchequer of hundreds of crores of rupees,
which could be used for modernisation of the Armed Forces.
* * * * * *
